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SERIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND 
SMALL BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES 
Douglas G. Baird* & Edward R. Morrison** 
Chapter 11 is thought to preserve the going-concern surplus of a finan- 
cially distressed business-the extra value that its assets possess in their cur- 
rent configuration. Financial distress leads to conflicts among creditors that 
can lead to inefficient liquidation of a business with going-concern surplus. 
Chapter 11 avoids this by providing the business with a way offashioning a 
new capital structure. This account of Chapter 11 fails to capture what is 
happening in the typical case. The typical Chapter 11 debtor is a small 
corporation whose assets are not specialized and rarely worth enough to pay 
tax claims. There is no business worth saving and there are no assets to fight 
over. The focal point is not the business, but the person who runs it. She is 
a serial entrepreneur, searching for the business that best matches her skills. 
For the vast majority of cases, then, Chapter 11 is best seen through the lens 
of labor economics, not corporate finance. Chapter 11 offers the entrepreneur 
increased liquidity as well as a forum for renegotiating debts (such as un- 
paid withholding taxes) for which she as well as the corporation are liable. 
But Chapter 11 offers these benefits only to entrepreneurs who remain with 
their existing businesses. This lock-in effect is qualitatively no different from 
the one commonly associated with rent control. These effects, as well as the 
costs the process imposes on third parties, should be the focus of any assess- 
ment of how well Chapter 11 works. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article presents a comprehensive study of businesses that make 
up the Chapter 11 docket of a large bankruptcy court over the course of a 
year.' The typical Chapter 11 cases are strikingly different from the cases 
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. We are grateful to Ken Ayotte, 
Zohar Goshen, Scott Hemphill, Ronald Mann, Eric Posner, Robert Rasmussen, George 
Triantis, and workshop participants at Cornell, Columbia, Berkeley, Chicago, the 2005 
Texas-Harvard Conference on Commercial Law Realities, the 2005 Meeting of the 
American Law and Economics Association, and the 2005 Federal Judicial Center/ 
Columbia Law School Program for Bankruptcy Judges for helpful comments. We are 
especially grateful to the bankruptcy judges of the Northern District of Illinois for giving us 
access to their dockets. We also thank our research assistants, who helped us with various 
parts of the dataset: Basil Alsikafi, Marika Butler, Blaine Evanson, David Glazek, Vivian Ho, 
and Alan Littmann. The work was funded in part by Columbia Law School, the John M. 
Olin Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, and the Russell Baker Scholars Fund. 
1. Our study is the first of its type. The empirical works studying typical Chapter 11 
cases to date have been largely mechanical time-and-motion studies of bankruptcy courts, 
focusing on such questions as the length of each case and the number that resulted in a 
successful plan of reorganization. Scant attention has been paid to the businesses 
themselves beyond such matters as the number of creditors and the amount they are owed. 
See generally Steven H. Ancel & Bruce A. Markell, Hope in the Heartland: Chapter 11 
Dispositions in Indiana and Southern Illinois, 1990-1996, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 343 (1999) 
2310 
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one ordinarily hears about. Instead of Uniteds, Enrons, or Kmarts, we see 
small businesses. There are few assets beyond the entrepreneur's human 
capital, and these rarely have more value inside the business than 
outside.2 It is therefore a mistake to ask whether the corporate entity that 
is the subject of the bankruptcy case is worth saving. For small businesses, 
the relevant unit of analysis is the owner and operator of the business, not 
the business itself. 
A small business is typically a spell in the life of its owner-operator. 
The owner-operator's human capital is fully portable and is used to start a 
string of businesses over her lifetime. She moves from business to busi- 
ness-often in the same industry---until finding a good match between 
her human capital and a particular business model.3 Much like the pro- 
cess of job shopping by workers,4 this search is the process by which a 
(reporting case outcome and duration); Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management 
and Delay Reduction: An Empirical Study, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85 (1996) (same, but 
also reporting effects of a case management program on duration); Lisa Hill Fenning & 
Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. 
Rev. 119 (1996) (same, but also reporting demographic characteristics-e.g., whether 
debtor was business or nonbusiness and, if business, its legal structure, total assets and 
debt, and industrial classification); Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of 
Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629 (2000) 
(reporting case outcome and duration, total assets and debt, and total fees); Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 
73 Am. Bankr. L.J. 499 (1999) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Financial 
Characteristics] (cataloging information listed on petitions and other schedules filed with 
the bankruptcy court). Such studies reveal little about the nature of the underlying 
business beyond what can be gleaned from the crude classification scheme on the 
bankruptcy petition itself. This scheme does not, for example, distinguish an importer of 
men's suits from a restaurant. This Article extends Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy 
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 
J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
Morrison, Continuation Bias]. 
2. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8) (using 1998 data 
on Chapter 11 filings in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and finding that 
roughly 80% of businesses had fewer than twenty employees, 75% had less than $1 million 
in assets, and about 50% had fewer than $100,000 in assets); Warren & Westbrook, 
Financial Characteristics, supra note 1, at 529, 548 (using 1994 data on Chapter 11 filings 
in twenty-three districts and finding that 75% of businesses had twenty-four or fewer 
employees, 70% had less than $1 million in assets, and 50% had fewer than $351,000 in 
assets). The characteristics of the typical Chapter 11 match those of small businesses 
generally, which account for half of both GDP and nongovernment employment in the 
United States. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., The Small Business Economy: A Report to the 
President 5 (2004). 
3. See generally Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, On the Turnover of Business 
Firms and Business Managers, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 1005 (1995) [hereinafter Holmes & 
Schmitz, Turnover] (presenting theoretical model illustrating this matching process); 
Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, Managerial Tenure, Business Age, and Small 
Business Turnover, 14 J. Lab. Econ. 79 (1996) (presenting empirical evidence consistent 
with implications of model). 
4. Job shopping, unlike business shopping by entrepreneurs, has spawned a vast 
literature. See, e.g., William R. Johnson, A Theory of Job Shopping, 92 Q.J. Econ. 261, 
261-77 (1978); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. Pol. 
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scarce resource (the owner's human capital) gravitates toward its most 
productive use. The owner-operator's human capital is not tied to any 
particular business enterprise; it can be redeployed when opportunities 
outside the existing enterprise are more attractive than those inside, 
which is precisely why most entrepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs. Just 
as taking account of job mobility is a fundamental feature of employment 
law,5 serial entrepreneurship should be central to any discussion of small 
business bankruptcies.6 In the world of small businesses, Chapter 11 is 
first and foremost a labor-market intervention. 
The standard account of Chapter 11 has a very different focus. It 
begins with a fundamental insight of corporate finance;' we must distin- 
guish the question of who owns assets from the question of how they are 
deployed. Chapter 11 comes into play when these two questions are con- 
founded.8 A business that cannot pay its creditors has a problem with its 
capital structure. No matter how well run, a business that generates oper- 
ating income of $100 a year cannot support annual interest obligations of 
Econ. 972, 972-90 (1979) [hereinafter Jovanovic, Job Matching]; Robert H. Topel & 
Michael P. Ward, Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men, 107 Q.J. Econ. 439, 439-79 
(1992). 
5. For example, there have been studies of the lock-in created by employer-provided 
health insurance. See generally Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte Madrian, Health Insurance, 
Labor Supply, and Job Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, in Health Policy and 
the Uninsured 97 (Catherine McLaughlin ed., 2004) (reviewing vast literature on health 
insurance, labor supply, and job mobility and discussing possible welfare implications). 
6. The large Chapter 11 cases, while only a tiny fraction of all Chapter 11s, are 
crucially different in this respect. In this context, a focus on the legal entity makes sense. 
The business of WorldCom, United Airlines, or Kmart cannot be meaningfully separated 
from the corporation (or, more precisely, corporate group) that files the bankruptcy 
petition. The corporate entity that formally enters bankruptcy owns the assets, employs the 
workers, and contracts with the rest of the world. Everyone understands, of course, that 
the boundary between a business and the rest of the world is permeable and necessarily 
fuzzy at the edges. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 
310-11 (1976) (suggesting that nature of firm as nexus for contracting relationships moots 
discussions of precise corporate boundaries). Nevertheless, sorting out the rights and 
obligations of the legal entity that houses a particular business is the principal challenge in 
these cases. 
7. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 268-73 (1958) (setting out 
conditions under which a company's value is independent of how much debt, as opposed 
to equity, is in its capital structure); Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions 
After Thirty Years, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1988, at 99, 99-102 (noting acceptance of original 
Modigliani-Miller propositions and discussing their impact on field of corporate finance). 
8. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of 
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 104-09 (1984); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27J. Fin. Econ. 411, 411 (1990); Robert 
K Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 
Wash. U. L.Q. 1159, 1161 (1994). For a general discussion of the relationship between 
finance and corporate reorganizations, see generally John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance 
Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 53 (1995). 
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$200. Such a business is in financial distress. This is a problem that goes 
to the ownership of the assets, not the way they are used. Sorting out the 
rights of competing creditors when there is not enough to pay them in 
full does not mean that anything is unsound with the underlying busi- 
ness. Financially distressed businesses are not necessarily in economic 
distress.9 The archetypal example is the railroad. Even if it costs too 
much to build, once built, its best use is as a railroad. The operating costs 
are comparatively small and the assets-narrow strips of land and steel 
rails-have little value in any other use. The railroad's assets are opti- 
mally deployed within the existing business structure even though it can- 
not pay what it owes.10 
Again, according to the usual account, without bankruptcy law, the 
problems with the capital structure (the ownership issue) lead to ineffi- 
cient liquidations (an asset deployment issue). Chapter 11 ensures this 
does not happen. It is a sorting mechanism."• It aims to identify the 
businesses that have greater value as going concerns than in piecemeal 
liquidation and provide a process for these businesses to acquire a capital 
structure consistent with their economic circumstances. The remaining 
businesses-those without going-concern value-are filtered out and ex- 
posed to liquidation. 
The tools of corporate finance also identify the costs of Chapter 11. 
As it accomplishes its sorting function, Chapter 11 allows the owner of the 
assets-the debtor-to make decisions about their deployment. As a re- 
sult, one worries that Chapter 11 will distort ex ante investment decisions. 
When the managers of the business are the shareholders, or are be- 
holden to them, they may engage in strategic behavior that reduces the 
creditors' payoffs in bankruptcy.'2 Anticipating this, creditors may be un- 
willing to invest in the business in the first place. Similarly, one worries 
9. For an empirical study of large businesses that focuses explicitly on this distinction, 
see generally Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not 
Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became 
Distressed, 53 J. Fin. 1443 (1998). 
10. For a discussion of railroad reorganizations as the precursor of modern Chapter 
11, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's Dominion 9, 48-70 (2001). For a discussion of financial 
and economic distress, see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale 
L.J. 573, 580-83 (1998). 
11. See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 
11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 268, 268 
(1994). Whether it is successful is a matter of debate. Cf. Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn 
Martel, Empirical Estimates of Filtering Failure in Court-Supervised Reorganization, 1 J. 
Empirical Legal Stud. 143, 145 (2004) (finding that corporate reorganizations in Canada, 
which "share[ ] many feature [s] with" Chapter 11 reorganizations, allow "too many" firms 
to restructure their debt). 
12. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343, 
358-59, 367-68 (1997) (explaining that Chapter 11 and most proposed reforms are 
inefficient, relative to regime allowing parties to contract about bankruptcy, because they 
permit continuation of nonviable firms); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to 
Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807, 1831-32 (1998) (showing that mandatory 
bankruptcy regimes, including Chapter 11, raise ex ante cost of capital). 
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that the managers' desire to keep their jobs will also delay the redeploy- 
ment of assets that are best used elsewhere.'3 There may be alternatives 
to Chapter 11 that take better advantage of capital markets.'4 Options 
and derivatives can solve financial distress problems at low cost.'5 
Thus runs the standard account.'16 But none of this matters in the 
typical small business bankruptcy. Whatever filtering is done has nothing 
13. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15J. Legal 
Stud. 127, 139-41 (1986) (explaining that managers are biased toward reorganization as 
opposed to liquidation even when latter is more efficient); Michael Bradley & Michael 
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043, 1050-51 (1992) 
(arguing that benefit of saving going-concern value in Chapter 11 must be weighed against 
risk that managers will make suboptimal and self-interested decisions during 
reorganization); Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of 
Interest, and Asset Stripping: Chapter 1 l's Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J. 
Fin. Econ. 55, 58 (1998) (asserting that management's exclusive right to file plan of 
reorganization in first 120 days of Chapter 11 case gives it opportunity to mismanage 
company at expense of its creditors). 
14. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate 
Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 559-93 (1983) (proposing market-based 
alternative in which reorganized firm's capital structure would consist entirely of equity, 
which would be valued by floating a fraction of it on capital markets). 
15. See generally Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing 
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 Yale L.J. 83 (2001) (setting forth particular options-based 
mechanism as alternative to Chapter 11); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to 
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988) (same). 
16. Alternative approaches to Chapter 11 emphasize goals beyond preserving going- 
concern value. See, e.g., Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 791, 
802-07 (1993). These approaches usually include arguments to the effect that a financially 
distressed corporation should take account of every party with a stake in the business and 
its future-not only creditors and shareholders, but workers, suppliers, customers, tort 
victims, and anyone else the business affects. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Failure and 
Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System 248-49 (1997). Bankruptcy's 
distributional scheme should not merely respect the rights of investors, but also ensure 
that workers, tort victims, and other nonadjusting creditors are treated fairly. Powerful 
creditors should not be able to commandeer the process to advance their own interests to 
the exclusion of others. As Warren and Westbrook put it: 
[The current bankruptcy system] constrain[s] the collection rights of each 
creditor individually in order to promote a somewhat more efficient liquidation 
or reorganization for the benefit of all concerned. This is accomplished by 
shrinking the collection rights of the most powerful creditors in order to achieve 
somewhat greater distribution among all those who have a stake in the debtor. 
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An 
Empirical Intervention, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1200-01 (2005) [hereinafter Warren & 
Westbrook, Contracting]. Bankruptcy judges must retain sufficient discretion to ensure a 
collective process that brings everyone to the table. A Chapter 11 corporate reorganization 
is a collective process in which interested parties take stock of the business and decide on 
its future. See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: AJurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 
91 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 765-71 (1991) (discussing presence of a "competition of diverse 
human values that are fundamentally incommensurable" in each bankruptcy case). 
Much of the work in this vein articulates these other goals and the need to balance 
everything simultaneously in terms so vague and abstract as to admit of no contradiction. 
See, e.g., id. at 722 (describing bankruptcy as a kind of "group therapy," or "a system with 
varied contours and dimensions, having the distinct function of facilitating the expression 
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to do with preserving going-concern value, as there are few, if any, spe- 
cialized assets17 and the entrepreneur can (and often does) recreate the 
same business at little or no cost.18 Distortions of ex ante investment de- 
cisions are irrelevant when the dominant creditor is a taxing authority, 
not a market actor making an investment decision.19 And, as there are 
few physical assets and even fewer specialized assets, ensuring efficient 
redeployment of assets is not a primary concern either. When there are 
few assets other than human capital, it makes no sense to focus on the 
corporate entity and its capital structure. The focus should instead be on 
the owner-operator, around whom the business is organized. In the 
world of small business, labor economics rather than corporate finance 
provides the relevant tools.20 
Seen from the vantage point of labor economics, a Chapter 11 cor- 
porate reorganization is just one of many government policies targeting 
small businesses, such as the Small Business Administration's loan, invest- 
ment, and bonding programs.21 Its benefits include "breathing space,"22 
temporary liquidity,23 greater bargaining power with particular creditors 
and recognition of those diverse values important in dealing with financial distress"); 
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 811 (1987) ("I have offered a 
dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view of bankruptcy from which I can neither predict 
outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all the factors relevant to a policy decision."). 
Nevertheless, these approaches focus squarely on the business and its future. See, e.g., 
Warren & Westbrook, Contracting, supra, at 1254 ("Bankruptcy is the forum in which our 
society makes its final decisions about the life and death of a business and who gets what. 
To that forum come bank lenders and pensioners, tort victims and trade creditors, . 
each with a different economic relationship with the debtor."). 
Such approaches, like the standard law and economics critique, are centered on the 
business and keeping it alive. This focus makes no sense in the context of the typical case. 
The focus should be on the owner-operator rather than the legal entity that houses the 
business or its general creditors who will, in any event, be left with nothing. Only by 
understanding the benefits that Chapter 11 brings the owner-operator (and the 
corresponding costs it imposes on her as well as others) can we begin to assess the current 
system and how it works in the typical case. 
17. See infra Part II.A.1. 
18. See infra Part II.A.2. 
19. See infra Part III.C.4. 
20. A seminal work in this literature is Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (3d ed. 1993). 
21. See U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA's Role in Providing Financial Assistance to 
America's Small Businesses, at http://www.sba.gov/financing/basics/sbarole.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing each program in 
detail). 
22. Although Chapter 11 (and bankruptcy law generally) is frequently described as 
"breathing space" for debtors, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: 
A Reply to Professor Baird, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 109, 116 n.42 (2004); George G. 
Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role 
of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 101, 110 (1996), we stress 
the Code's function as breathing space not for the corporate debtor but for its owner- 
operator. 
23. Debt service is generally suspended during the pendency of the case. 11 U.S.C. 
? 362(a) (2000). 
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(especially landlords), and an opportunity to renegotiate debts-owed to 
banks and the Internal Revenue Service-that have been personally guar- 
anteed by the owner-operator.24 
While most programs designed to aid small entrepreneurs are availa- 
ble to any business that is sufficiently small,25 Chapter 11 provides its ben- 
efits in a way that is narrow and arbitrary. Entrepreneurs must remain 
with their current business to enjoy Chapter 11's benefits.26 Hence, 
Chapter 11 encourages entrepreneurs who do business in corporate form 
to remain with that particular corporate form longer than they might oth- 
erwise. This lock-in effect is the principal cost of the small business bank- 
ruptcy and yet it has been wholly neglected in the literature. 
One can argue that Chapter 11 facilitates the transition from one 
business to another, and that the bankruptcy process smoothes the entre- 
preneur's path. Chapter 11 might overcome bargaining failures that un- 
dermine out-of-court workouts between a business and a lending bank.27 
Alternatively, Chapter 11 might be an effective way to renegotiate owner- 
operators' personal guarantees of their corporations' indebtedness. The 
bank may be willing to renegotiate the guarantee, particularly because 
the owner is a serial entrepreneur who will likely succeed in a future busi- 
ness, but be unwilling to do so without credible evidence that the original 
business has failed. Chapter 11 may offer a relatively low-cost mechanism 
for verifying the assets of the business and assessing their value.28 
24. We discuss these benefits in detail in Part III. The owner-operator "guarantees" 
that withholding taxes are turned over to the IRS in the sense that the IRS imposes on 
individuals a "trust fund recovery penalty" equal to the amount of unpaid taxes for 
businesses whose affairs they controlled. I.R.C. ? 6672 (Thomson 2005). 
25. "Small" is defined in terms of employment (e.g., less than 500 employees for most 
manufacturing and mining industries) or average annual receipts (e.g., less than $6 
million for most retail and service industries). See U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQs) About Small Business Size Standards, at http://www.sba.gov/ 
size/indexfaqs.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
26. The focus in this Article is on corporate reorganizations, not on the ability of 
individual entrepreneurs to discharge personal indebtedness and thereby obtain a "fresh 
start." Individuals can use Chapter 11 as well as Chapter 7 and, when used for this purpose 
by flesh and blood individuals, Chapter 11 does not tie entrepreneurs to a particular 
business venture. Indeed, as shown below, see infra notes 39, 50, the presence of the lock- 
in effect in corporate Chapter 11s, but not individual Chapter 11s, renders seriously 
problematic any study of Chapter 11 that conflates the two. 
27. Ayotte argues that bankruptcy law can play an important role in helping 
entrepreneurs obtain efficient levels of debt forgiveness. See Kenneth M. Ayotte, 
Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3-5, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at 
http://wwwl.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/726/freshst-jleo-9- 
04.pdf. 
28. Arguments along these lines have been made by Ronald M. Giammarino, The 
Resolution of Financial Distress, 2 Rev. Fin. Stud. 25, 28-30 (1989), and David C. Webb, 
The Importance of Incomplete Information in Explaining the Existence of Costly 
Bankruptcy, 54 Economica 279, 284-87 (1987). 
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But it is equally plausible that Chapter 11 hinders the transition from 
one business to another. Rewarding entrepreneurs to stay put is suspect. 
Few would advocate for a policy that forgives an individual's tax liabilities 
only if she remains with her current employer. Yet Chapter 11 has pre- 
cisely the same structure. Indeed, it closely resembles rent control. Rent 
control prevents landlords from raising the rent on existing tenants and 
thereby induces tenants to stay too long in an otherwise undesirable 
apartment.29 Chapter 11 may likewise encourage entrepreneurs to stay 
too long with the wrong business.30 
As we assess the costs and benefits of Chapter 11 in the typical case, 
we should also be careful not to exaggerate the stakes. Perhaps only ten 
to fifteen percent of all failing businesses ever file a bankruptcy peti- 
tion.3' An even smaller fraction use Chapter 11.32 For the typical corpo- 
rations that enter Chapter 11, the benefits and costs are both modest.33 
29. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing 
Under Rent Control, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1027, 1031 (2003). 
30. The effect is, of course, not limited to rent control and Chapter 11. It happens 
whenever the law induces people to keep assets longer than they would otherwise. 
Another example is taxation of realized, but not unrealized, appreciation in the value of an 
asset. Because the tax has to be paid only when the asset is sold, it encourages investors to 
hold onto appreciating assets. See David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line 
Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 71, 72 (2000). 
31. It appears that only a small fraction of troubled businesses ever file a bankruptcy 
petition. Reliable data on this issue is unavailable. Among other things, identifying what 
counts as a discrete business is elusive. Millions who are employed full-time by someone 
else earn some income on the side. Each of these sidelines, or indeed anything that 
generates Schedule C income, might be considered a discrete business. Dun & Bradstreet, 
a supplier of credit ratings and other business information, appears to apply a less 
expansive definition; its data indicate that for every one hundred businesses that close 
their doors, only ten to fifteen will ever file a bankruptcy petition. See Leora Klapper et al., 
Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data, at Annex 3 
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10380, 2004), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w10380.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). These liquidity- 
constrained businesses are surely deterred by the prospect of paying thousands of dollars 
of upfront legal fees merely to file a petition. A business will often pay over $5,000 upfront 
merely to obtain the assistance of an attorney. Telephone Interview with Karen J. Porter, 
Partner, The Law Offices of Karen J. Porter (Oct. 29, 2004). Ms. Porter and her former 
business, Minchella & Porter, represented six percent of the businesses in our study. 
32. Most business bankruptcy filings are made under Chapter 7, not Chapter 11. 
During the twelve months ending September 2004, for example, the courts received 34,817 
business filings. Only 9,436 of these were filed under Chapter 11; 20,234 were filed under 
Chapter 7. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 
2004, at tbl.F-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/contents.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
33. The primary focus of this Article is the lock-in effect, which is an indirect cost of 
the bankruptcy process. We should not, however, neglect the direct costs. During the 
pendency of a Chapter 11 case, median (mean) administrative costs will amount to about 
2% (17%) of a business's total assets, as measured at the time of the petition. See Arturo 
Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy 19 & tbl.9 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 
04-13, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=523562 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (using combined data on large and small Chapter 11s 
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The 
"breathing space" is short-lived: Judges identify and shut down most 
failing businesses within six months.34 Moreover, the businesses that re- 
main in Chapter 11 the longest (and where lock-in is potentially the most 
costly) are usually those businesses in which the serial entrepreneur can 
match his or her human capital with a business within the same corporate 
shell.35 These are typically situations in which the business has suffered 
distress as a result of overexpansion (such as opening a second store that 
fails). The socially optimal strategy for the entrepreneur is to shed the 
excess capacity and retreat to the core business that she once ran success- 
fully. Staying with the same business therefore imposes few costs. She is 
like the tenant who would continue to live in the same apartment even 
without rent control; there is no efficiency loss when tenants living in 
rent-controlled apartments are the same tenants who would pay the most 
to live in those apartments.36 
A change in academic and political debates about Chapter 11 is in 
order. We need to move the debate about Chapter 11 and its effects on 
particular businesses to one that focuses squarely on the serial entrepre- 
neur. Chapter 11 should help (or at least not distort) the efforts of entre- 
preneurs to find businesses that best suit their skills. It can do this best by 
providing an efficient forum for resolving disputes and disposing of as- 
sets. Current academic thinking about small business bankruptcy pushes 
in exactly the wrong direction by promoting the business, not the 
entrepreneur. 
Part I describes our methodology and our dataset. Part II shows that 
small businesses in bankruptcy generally lack specialized assets and, as a 
result, have little going-concern surplus. These findings indicate that 
Chapter 11 serves no purpose if it focuses on preserving the entity that 
houses nonspecialized assets. They also raise questions about the reasons 
why owner-operators find Chapter 11 attractive. If the Code does not 
play an important role in preserving going-concern surplus, why do entre- 
preneurs ever put their businesses in Chapter 11? Part III explores sev- 
eral possible answers, all of which underscore the principal and alto- 
gether neglected cost of Chapter 11: It discourages small entrepreneurs 
from exiting existing businesses and finding new, sometimes better 
matches with their human capital-either a new business or an employ- 
ment opportunity. 
filed in Arizona and Southern District of New York between 1995 and 2001). Whether 
these are large or small is hard to say, given that a financially distressed business will face 
some costs in any event. But the lock-in effect of Chapter 11 will induce entrepreneurs to 
incur higher direct costs in order to secure the benefits of Chapter 11. 
34. Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 12-13). 
35. See infra Part III.C.4. 
36. See Glaeser & Luttmer, supra note 29, at 1030-31. 
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I. THE WORLD OF CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 
When a flesh and blood entrepreneur files her own personal bank- 
ruptcy petition either in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, the principal conse- 
quence is the discharge of her individual debt.37 Bankruptcy's fresh start 
unequivocally facilitates her search for a new business because the fresh 
start is not in any way conditioned on continuing the old business.38 Cor- 
porate Chapter 11s, the cases of interest to us, are dramatically different. 
When the entrepreneur places her corporation in bankruptcy, her per- 
sonal debts are unaffected. Whatever benefits the entrepreneur enjoys 
from Chapter 11 are conditioned upon the old corporation remaining 
intact. Because it ties her fate to the business, regardless of whether it 
makes sense for her to remain there, Chapter 11 can interfere with the 
entrepreneur's effort to find the right match for her human capital.39 
A. Methodology and Data 
This Article examines the docket of one bankruptcy court over the 
course of a single year, the corporate Chapter 11 cases filed in the East- 
ern Division of the Northern District of Illinois (Northern District) dur- 
ing calendar year 1998. The Northern District's jurisdiction encompasses 
Chicago, Cook County, and outlying areas-a large and diverse econ- 
omy.40 Relative to the economy of the country as a whole, there is less 
37. For an overview of consumer bankruptcy, see generally Douglas G. Baird, 
Elements of Bankruptcy 30-61 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy]. 
38. Fan and White, for example, show that homeowning families are significantly 
more likely to own a business and to start new businesses if they live in states with high or 
unlimited Chapter 7 exemption levels than if they live in states with low exemption levels. 
Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial 
Activity, 46 J.L. & Econ. 543, 556 (2003). 
39. It is for this reason that this Article focuses exclusively on corporate Chapter 11 
cases. Pooling corporate and individual Chapter 11 cases together, as other studies do, is a 
serious mistake. See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, Contracting, supra note 16, at 1208 
("Debtors in the sample [used in the article] are a mix of human beings, partnerships, 
corporations, and other forms of legal entities."). It masks the most important features of 
Chapter 11 as it applies to corporate and individual debtors respectively. Of course, to 
understand what was happening in corporate Chapter 11 cases, we need to know whether 
the owner of the business filed a personal bankruptcy petition herself, either at the same 
time as the Chapter 11, before it, or afterwards. This is one of the many pieces of 
information we gathered for our database. Real estate ventures also file Chapter 11 
petitions, but typically involve investment vehicles with a single creditor and no operating 
business. See Douglas G. Baird, Remembering Pine Gate, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 5, 15-16 
(2004) (stating that most Chapter 11 cases concern "[s]mall businesses and failed real 
estate deals," and that most real estate bankruptcies involve only two people, a secured 
creditor and an investor "with a leaky tax shelter"). Looking at all types of cases is, 
however, appropriate in an empirical study of the bankruptcy process itself. See, e.g., 
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A 
Sideshow, Am. Bankr. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 22-31, on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (examining both consumer and corporate bankruptcy cases in study of 
adversary proceedings in bankruptcy and identifying differences between them). 
40. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5). 
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agriculture and more manufacturing, but it is as suitable a place as any to 
take the pulse of economic activity generally and corporate Chapter 11 
cases in particular.4' Calendar year 1998 is recent enough that the 
docket is accessible electronically, but far enough in the past such that we 
can see what happened to the business once Chapter 11 had run its 
course.42 
The Northern District was also chosen because of the rich supply of 
data. The court's judges permitted access to a database43 containing cop- 
ies of every filing and judicial order in these cases. We reviewed the 
docket of each case, including the bankruptcy petition, the schedules, 
and any filings (such as disclosure statements) that discuss the underlying 
business. These sources give detailed information about each business's 
finances (assets, debt, cash flow, etc.), history (including events that led 
to the bankruptcy petition), experience in bankruptcy (e.g., time in bank- 
ruptcy, types of motions filed by the debtor and its creditors, types of 
court orders), and information about the career history of the owner- 
operator. 
We augmented this career-history information using data collected 
by the Secretary of State of Illinois and made available on LexisNexis, 
such as whether the owner-operator in a Chapter 11 case established 
other businesses, the nature of these businesses, and their histories. We 
then returned to the bankruptcy court files and searched for any other 
bankruptcy petitions filed by the same corporation or the principal of the 
corporation. We also consulted newspaper stories about the businesses 
and the people running them. When necessary, we contacted the princi- 
pals of these businesses or those who succeeded them, purchased the bus- 
iness's assets, or leased the same premises. When necessary, we also vis- 
ited the businesses themselves. 
The Northern District's bankruptcy judges are highly respected pro- 
fessionals. Its members in 1998 included prominent members of the Na- 
tional Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the American College of Bank- 
ruptcy, and the National Bankruptcy Conference.44 One was later 
41. See id. (showing that Northern District is similar to other large, metropolitan 
areas across the country). 
42. This was a time of relative economic prosperity, so our data describe the typical 
cases that arise in nonrecessionary times. Bankruptcy cases in bad times might, of course, 
look different. 
43. The database, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), can be 
accessed for a fee at http://www.pacer.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). The 
Northern District waived the fee for this study. 
44. Eugene R. Wedoff is a member of the National Bankruptcy Conference and the 
American College of Bankruptcy. Am. Coll. of Bankr., Directory-Eugene R. Wedoff, at 
http://www.amercol.org/dir/bio.cfm?id=519 (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); Nat'l Bankr. Conference, Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, at http:// 
www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/bios/wedoff.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). He also serves on the Board of Governors of the 
National Conference of BankruptcyJudges. Id. Robert Ginsberg (now retired) was also a 
member of the American College of Bankruptcy, Am. Coll. of Bankr., Directory-Robert 
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appointed to the District Court.45 There is little danger that the peculiar- 
ities or eccentricities of this bench distorted the types of cases filed 
there.46 For these reasons, we believe our sample is representative of 
small business Chapter 11 cases and, at least in industrial composition, 
representative of small businesses generally. 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE SELECTION 
Petitions 
Initial sample 184 
Deletions or consolidations: 
Individual debtor cases (42) 
Single asset real estate cases (22) 
Sister companies (7) 
Repeat filings (4) 
Large, publicly traded businesses (2) 
Businesses without owner-managers (2) 
Simultaneous involuntary petitions (1) 
Final sample 104 
As Table 1 indicates, the Northern District received 184 Chapter 11 
filings during 1998. For this Article, we focus on a subset of these filings: 
small corporations owned and operated by the same person-the owner- 
operator.47 Table 1 also shows that we consolidated seven filings by sister 
companies (the court consolidated these cases as well), and eliminated 
E. Ginsberg, at http://www.amercol.org/dir/bio.cfm?id=178 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review), the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, id., 
the National Bankruptcy Conference, Nat'l Bankr. Conference, Hon. Robert E. Ginsberg, 
at http://www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/bios/ginsberg.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), and Vice-Chair of the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission, Nat'l Bankr. Review Comm'n, Commission Members and Staff, at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/members.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). Ronald Barliant (now in private practice) was similarly a 
member of the American College of Bankruptcy, Am. Coll. of Bankr., Directory-Ronald 
Barliant, at http://www.amercol.org/dir/bio.cfm?id=623 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review), and the Board of the National Conference of 
Bankruptcy Judges, Goldberg Kohn, Attorneys at Law: Ronald Barliant 1 3, at http:// 
www.goldbergkohn.com/Bio/RonaldBarliant.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
45. Joan Humphrey Lefkow was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois; she received her commission on July 11, 2000. Fed. Judicial Ctr., 
Lefkow, Joan Humphrey, at http://air.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=2882 (last visited Aug. 
16, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
46. There are two potential distortions worth noting. First, the motions practice of 
the Northern District is somewhat different from that of other courts. As one of us has 
discussed elsewhere, this motions practice may have the effect of making the court more 
responsive to abuses or more likely to dismiss cases early in the process. See Morrison, 
Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14 n.35). Second, the IRS is a large 
presence in our cases. Id. To the extent that local IRS practices vary (and are known to 
vary), this too could affect the population of cases that file in the Northern District. 
47. Our dataset includes twenty-two real estate cases and forty-two filings by flesh and 
blood individuals. For the reasons noted above, we are not focusing on them in this 
Article. 
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four repeat filings by the same businesses and one involuntary petition 
filed days before the business filed its own voluntary petition. Finally, we 
eliminated two filings by large, publicly traded corporations and two fil- 
ings by moderately sized corporations that were not owner managed. 
The two publicly traded corporations had over seven hundred employees 
each, far more than the five-hundred-employee cutoff used by the Small 
Business Administration as an indicator of a "small business."48 The two 
moderately sized businesses had fewer than five hundred employees but 
were different from the other businesses in this study because they exhib- 
ited the classic separation of ownership and control associated with large 
corporations.49 It should be noted, however, that the results reported 
below are unaffected by the exclusion of these moderately sized busi- 
nesses. After making these exclusions and consolidations, our sample of 
Chapter 11 filings falls from 184 to 104 observations. 
The cases in our sample are, to the extent we can tell, similar to 
Chapter 11 cases filed elsewhere in terms of the amount of debt, the 
amount of assets, and other characteristics reported in other studies.50 
48. See supra note 25. 
49. By "separation of ownership and control" we mean the decision by the owners of a 
business to allocate decisionmaking authority to agents (managers) who own only a 
fraction of the business and, therefore, bear only a fraction of the costs and benefits of 
their decisions. This phenomenon is a fundamental characteristic of modern corporations 
and a central focus of modern corporate finance scholarship, as emphasized by Berle and 
Means, and Jensen and Meckling, among others. See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property 127-52 (1932); Jensen & Meckling, supra 
note 6, at 308-10. The two large, publicly traded corporations-Mercury Finance and First 
Enterprise Financial Group-exhibited such separation: The owners were widely 
dispersed shareholders; the managers held minority ownership interests. The two 
moderately sized businesses-Tradetech Americas and Abtox, Inc.-exhibited the same 
separation. Only 35% of Abtox's equity was held by directors of the corporation; the rest 
was owned by a broad range of pension funds, insurance companies, and individual 
investors. Statement of Financial Affairs Item 19, In re AbTox, Inc., No. 98-22583 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. July 22, 1998). Although about 70% of Tradetech's equity was held by its top 
three executives when creditors filed an involuntary petition, List of Equity Security 
Holders, In re Tradetech Ams., Inc., No. 98-21105 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1999), control 
over the corporation was in the hands of other investors. On July 10, 1998, the day after 
Tradetech's Chapter 11 filing, the top executives were replaced. Statement of Financial 
Affairs at Item 20.b, In re Tradetech Ams., No. 98-21105. Six months later the firm was sold 
to one of its institutional investors. See Order Approving Disclosure Statement, 
Confirming Debtor's Plan of Liquidation, and Authorizing Sale of Certain Assets out of the 
Ordinary Course of Business, In re Tradetech Ams., No. 98-21105; see also Motion for 
Approval of Sale of Assets and for Related Relief at 6, In re Tradetech Ams., No. 98-21105 
(explaining that substantially all of debtor's assets would be sold to a corporation headed 
by Richard Lynch, who had been one of debtor's directors). 
50. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8-10) (comparing 
1998 data on Northern District to data presented in other studies of Chapter 11). As 
shown there, conclusions about the comparability of our sample to cases filed in other 
bankruptcy courts are necessarily tentative. Id. Our work can be compared with other 
studies using only the crude classifications on the bankruptcy petition itself, as other 
scholars typically have not gone beyond them. See supra note 1. Nevertheless, wherever 
others have gone beyond the face of the petition, their findings are consistent with ours. 
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Indeed, the businesses themselves look much like businesses as a whole in 
the economy. By examining Tables 2 and 3 together, we can compare 
the characteristics of businesses in our sample to those of corporations in 
the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), a representative na- 
tional sample of small businesses administered by the Federal Reserve 
Board.5" The industry composition of businesses in our sample differs 
from the distribution of SSBF corporations in a few respects. Wholesale 
Trade is underrepresented in our sample; Eating and Drinking Places 
and Business Services are overrepresented. The percentage of businesses 
with fewer than twenty employees is about the same, around 80%, in both 
samples. Relative to SSBF businesses, however, the ones in our sample 
are markedly younger: The median age is 6.8 years, relative to 13 years in 
the SSBF. And, not surprisingly, the businesses in our sample have fewer 
assets, more debt, and much more leverage than the average business in 
the SSBF. In short, the distressed businesses in our sample are somewhat 
smaller, younger, and more concentrated in the eating and drinking and 
services sectors.52 Similar patterns characterize corporate Chapter 7 fil- 
ings in the Northern District.53 
For example, Sullivan et al. supplemented data from the petitions and schedules with 
telephone interviews, and their findings are consistent with our finding that the principals 
of Chapter 11 corporate debtors are serial entrepreneurs. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., 
Financial Difficulties of Small Businesses and Reasons for Their Failure 30 (U.S. Small Bus. 
Admin., Working Paper No. SBA-95-0403, 1998), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/ 
research/rs188tot.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that three-quarters 
of debtors have previous experience as an owner or manager of another business). This 
study, however, looked at debtors in Chapters 7, 11, and 13 and did not distinguish 
corporate debtors from individuals for the purposes of its analysis. Id. at 5, 17-18. Some 
of the debtors whom they found to have started new businesses likely were associated with 
corporations that had filed Chapter 11 petitions, but there is no way to know how many. 
Again, one can draw only limited inferences from a dataset that fails to distinguish between 
individuals and corporations. This is especially true with respect to an issue where, 
depending on whether the debtor is an individual or a corporation, the Bankruptcy Code 
pushes in opposite directions, in the former case facilitating the search for a match 
between human capital and the right business, and in the latter case putting a brake on it. 
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
51. For more information about this survey, see Marianne P. Bitler et al., Financial 
Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business 
Finances, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 183, 183 (2001) (explaining that SSBF is the "most 
comprehensive source" for information on finances of small businesses). 
52. That eating and drinking establishments are overrepresented in bankruptcy 
squares with anecdotal evidence, but again one must caution against generalizing. Other 
empirical studies of Chapter 11 do not look at the underlying businesses enough to even 
know how many are eating and drinking establishments. See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, 
Financial Characteristics, supra note 1, at 529-32 (reporting only broad business 
categories-e.g., "Retail/Wholesale," "Manufacturing/Mining"-listed on face sheets of 
bankruptcy filings); Bris et al., supra note 33 (not reporting industrial characteristics of 
sample businesses). 
53. We confirmed this by randomly sampling 75 of the more than 300 corporate 
Chapter 7 filings from the Northern District in 1998. We identified these filings by 
searching court records for cases in which the debtor's name included "Co.," "Corp.," 
"Inc.," or another identifier of a corporate entity. These filings matched the Chapter 11 
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TABLE 2: STATISTICS, CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 FILINGS IN NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DURING 1998 
Age in Asset 
years Value, $ Leverage, % 
Under 20 median median Debt, $ median 
Industry % Employees, (mean) (mean) median (mean) 
(SIC No.) (freq) % (sd) (sd) (sd) (mean) (sd) (sd) 
Construction 13.5 76.9 7.0 467,201 823,977 2.8 
(15-17) (14) (12.5) (1,236,721) (2,797,048) (4.6) 
Manufacturing 11.5 91.7 28.4 405,163 1,130,172 3.3 
(20-39) (12) (31.6) (1,541,870) (11,300,000) (5.7) 
Transportation 3.9 100.0 4.5 103,350 253,512 1.8 
(40-48) (4) (5.3) (103,350) (378,912) (1.8) 
Wholesale 2.9 100.0 10.1 24,826 1,210,366 7.3 
Trade (3) (8.4) (176,217) (1,022,860) (29.1) 
(4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade 13.5 71.4 6.5 221,116 1,230,304 3.1 
(52-59) (14) (11.5) (950,756) (2,425,506) (6.3) 
Eating and 18.3 71.4 3.5 56,172 272,882 5.2 
Drinking Places (19) (11.7) (204,455) (705,415) (6.1) 
(58) 
Insurance and 2.9 100.0 13.1 26,652 341,012 20.1 
Finance (3) (12.5) (24,332) (1,521,263) (44.5) 
(60-69) 
Business 17.3 81.3 7.3 149,225 515,238 2.4 
Services (18) (9.9) (686,330) (828,243) (12.4) 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional 16.4 85.7 6.8 130,970 382,518 2.6 
Services (17) (9.8) (367,101) (800,685) (46.4) 
(80-89) 
TOTAL 100.0 81.5 6.8 148,090 550,048 3.3 
(104) (39.02) (13.1) (715,532) (2,513,199) (15.7) 
(16.11) (1,539,281) (10,700,000) (65.02) 
If we look closely at the bankruptcy experience of the businesses in 
our sample, some important patterns emerge. Table 4 shows that the 
majority of these (62.5%) will be shut down in bankruptcy or will have 
their petitions dismissed and thereby be exposed to liquidation under 
state law. In other words, in over 60% of the cases, Chapter 11 "fails" in 
the sense that the distressed business leaves Chapter 11 with its problems 
unresolved. In another eight cases (7.7%), the business is sold off as a 
going concern. In still another eight cases, the debtor solves the 
problems that brought it into bankruptcy (such as a threat of eviction by 
the landlord) without going through the process of confirming a formal 
plan of reorganization (such as reaching a side deal with the landlord). 
In only 23 of the 104 cases (22.1%) do we see something resembling a 
traditional reorganization, and only 14 of these remain in business, as 
Table 5 shows. In the others, the reorganized business subsequently 
cases in debts, assets, age, number of employees, and other characteristics. In observing 
this, however, we are not claiming that they are identical. The Chapter 7 cases, for 
example, included twice as many construction businesses and half as many restaurants. 
Again, different forces are at work. 
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS, CORPORATIONS IN 1998 SSBF 
(EXCLUDING MINING AND REAL ESTATE) 
Age in Asset 
years Value, $ Debt, $ Leverage 
Under 20 median median median median 
Industry % Employees (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) 
(SIC No.) (freq) % (se) (se) (se) (se) (se) 
Construction 11.2 80.6 14 520,706 317,040 .74 
(15-17) (187) (2.79) (14.6) (756,062) (544,899) (.72) 
(.94) (131,399) (109,672) (.059) 
Manufacturing 11.7 71.1 15 1,682,902 796,000 .59 
(20-39) (287) (3.07) (14.6) (1,499,328) (854,470) (.57) 
(.83) (170,572) (99,758) (.032) 
Transportation 3.3 75.2 11.5 834,219 673,488 .73 
(40-48) (74) (5.30) (10.5) (953,939) (668,717) (.70) 
(1.59) (228,740) (146,548) (.094) 
Wholesale 11.3 84.4 14 795,000 400,000 .54 
Trade (179) (2.45) (14.7) (1,149,670) (732,278) (.64) 
(4813, 50-51) (1.38) (151,521) (125,948) (.080) 
Retail Trade 15.2 84.0 15 360,000 203,000 .64 
(52-59) (263) (2.11) (14.7) (764,249) (474,712) (.62) 
(.91) (97,563) (66,630) (.069) 
Eating and 3.6 59.2 14.5 254,667 138,875 .61 
Drinking Places (102) (6.05) (13.2) (306,869) (172,569) (.56) 
(58) (1.10) (53,990) (28,709) (.084) 
Insurance and 2.7 91.5 13 116,880 121,000 .70 
Finance (35) (3.59) (17.4) (368,816) (570,641) (1.55) 
(60-69) (2.28) (92,524) (226,090) (.663) 
Business 23.9 90.3 10 141,273 71,891 .55 
Services (372) (1.31) (11.9) (376,597) (262,987) (.70) 
(47-49, 70-79) (.56) (65,905) (64,171) (.173) 
Professional 17.1 86.2 12 123,214 64,849 .55 
Services (305) (1.83) (13.4) (373,878) (231,567) (.62) 
(80-89) (.75) (87,058) (52,637) (.119) 
TOTAL 100.0 83.1 13.0 320,971 191,660 .59 
(1804) (0.56) (13.7) (713,023) (462,848) (.65) 
(.323) (36,472) (29,056) (.034) 
Note: Reported means are estimates of population averages (with associated standard errors) and were 
computed using survey weights. Reported medians are simply the 50th percentile of the raw, 
unweighted data. 
failed and either filed another bankruptcy petition or was liquidated 
under state law. Failure typically occurred within two and a half years of 
reorganization. 
B. Viewing Chapter 11 Outcomes Through the Lens of Labor Economics 
Do these different legal outcomes matter? Does the success or fail- 
ure of Chapter 11 affect the economic productivity of the business? 
These are generally thought to be easy questions with an obvious an- 
swer-namely, that a business will die and its productivity disappear if its 
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TABLE 4: BANKRUPTCY OUTCOMES, BY INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
% restructured % sold % shut down 
% reorganized without plan off or dismissed 
Industry (SIC No.) Frequency (sd) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Construction 14 21.4 0.0 0.0 78.6 
(15-17) 
Manufacturing 12 25.0 16.67 25.0 33.3 
(20-39) 
Transportation 4 0.0 25.0 0.0 75.0 
(40-48) 
Wholesale Trade 3 33.3 0.0 0.0 66.7 
(4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade 14 28.6 14.3 14.3 42.9 
(52-59) 
Eating and Drinking 19 21.5 5.3 10.5 63.2 
Places (58) 
Insurance Agents 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
(60-69) 
Business Services 18 27.8 0.0 5.6 66.7 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional Services 17 17.7 11.8 0.0 70.6 
(80-89) 
TOTAL 104 22.1 7.7 7.7 62.5 
(41.70) (26.78) (26.78) (48.65) 
Chapter 11 filing is unsuccessful.54 These questions, however, are not so 
easy. To be sure, a few Chapter 11 filings involve corporations in which a 
focus on the corporate entity makes sense. There are businesses that ex- 
ist independently of whoever happens to own them, and they are qualita- 
tively similar to the large Chapter 11 cases that make the headlines. A 
restaurant/microbrewery is sold as a going concern,55 as are a chain of 
Mrs. Field's cookie franchises56 and a hotel.57 A manufacturer of furnace 
linings sorts out its asbestos liabilities in Chapter 11.58 But these busi- 
nesses-like Chapter 11 filings involving large corporations-are rare.59 
54. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("In 
proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled 
enterprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future . 
Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a 
rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap.'"); Robert L. Jordan et al., Bankruptcy 633 
(5th ed. 1999) ("[S]ociety is better off also when a firm that is worth more alive than dead 
is successfully rehabilitated."); Mark S. Scarberry et al., Business Reorganization in 
Bankruptcy 1-2 (2d ed. 2001) ("Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code gives 
financially distressed businesses an opportunity to reorganize and avoid liquidation ... 
The fundamental premise of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that reorganization is 
desirable."). 
55. In re Windy City Brewers, L.L.C., No. 98-30630 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 1999). 
56. In re Butterwings Entm't Group, Inc., No. 98-28776 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 
1999). 
57. In re Am. Inn's, Inc., No. 98-29661 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1999). 
58. In re M.H. Detrick Co., No. 98-1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2001). 
59. For such a business to exist, it must, at a minimum, have brought together people 
or assets in a way that cannot be replicated at little or no cost. It is for this reason that the 
archetype of the business most suited for reorganization is the railroad. The assets possess 
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TABLE 5: OUTCOMES OF REORGANIZATIONS 
Business failed after Mean years until 
reorganizing failure after 
(frequency) (n) reorganizing 
Industrial (SIC No.) (%) (sd) (sd) 
Construction (15-17) 1 (3) .9 
Manufacturing (20-39) 1 (3) 4.5 
Transportation (40-48) 
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50-51) 0 (1) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 1 (4) 1.8 
Eating and Drinking Places (58) 1 (4) 2.5 
Insurance Agents (60-69) 
Business Services (47-49, 70-79) 2 (5) 2.5 
Professional Services (80-89) 3 (3) 2.2 
TOTAL 9 (23) 2.5 
(39.1) (49.90) (1.54) 
Much more common are businesses organized around the skills of 
the owner-operator. The business and its owner-operator are one and 
the same. The business may be a livery service,60 a small trucking busi- 
ness,61 or a travel62 or insurance63 agency. In each case, it is impossible 
to separate the business from the person running it. As a result, any ef- 
fort to sort out the rights and obligations of the corporation in bank- 
ruptcy has only a tangential effect on the business itself. These businesses 
consist of relationships, not assets, and the relationships belong to the 
individual, not the corporation.64 If you were happy with the work per- 
value only if kept together. The right-hand rails are worth little without the left-hand ones. 
Our data, however, shows the absence of assets or anything else that would give the 
business value as a going concern. As one of us has observed elsewhere, there are no 
railroads here. Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of 
Small-Business Bankruptcies 57 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago) (on file with author). Our work here ties to other scholarship suggesting that 
even large financially distressed businesses lack going-concern value and the other 
attributes traditionally used to justify a regime such as Chapter 11. See, e.g., Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmusssen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 768-77 
(2002) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy]. 
60. In re ABO Taxicab Ass'n Inc., No. 98-23646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1998). 
61. In re Sam's Cartage Co., No. 98-8367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1999). 
62. In re Adventura Int'l, No. 98-15986 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1998); In re Gary 
Wheaton Travel, L.L.C., No. 98-5805 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 26, 1998). 
63. In re NIS, Inc., No. 98-11271 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2000); In re Cooper & 
Soble Ins. Agency, No. 98-20198 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1999). 
64. If the corporation had an existence apart from the small entrepreneur, it could 
force her to sign a covenant not to compete. This would, in effect, give the corporation a 
sort of 
"ownership" over the relationships the entrepreneur established. Many states have 
limitations on the enforceability of such covenants, however. See Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, 
and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 627-28 (1999). More to the point, 
the entrepreneur who owns and controls the company has no reason to tie her hands this 
way. In theory, a large institutional lender might insist on such covenants, but such lenders 
insist that the entrepreneur bond themselves with personal guarantees, rather than with 
covenants not to compete. See infra Table 17. 
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formed last year and want to use the same people again, you are indiffer- 
ent to the existence of the corporation. You might reengage this entre- 
preneur without ever knowing (or caring) that the corporate form she is 
using this year is different from the one she used last year.65 For such 
entrepreneurs and everyone who does business with them in the future, 
the bankruptcy of the corporation has virtually no effect. 
Small-business entrepreneurs have a taste for running their own busi- 
nesses. They start their businesses and continue to run them even 
though they would earn more elsewhere,66 and even though owning such 
a business requires tying up much of their wealth-typically about 
half67-in the business. The strongest predictor of whether an individual 
will open a business is whether his parents did.68 It is not a question of 
children being brought into the family business. Most of those who run 
their own business run a business different from that of their parents.69 
A parent's self-employment experience has a large and statistically signifi- 
cant effect on a son's likelihood of becoming self-employed, even after 
controlling for parental wealth and the son's wealth (and other 
covariates) .70 
65. The customer is indifferent because the corporate form does little more than 
partition assets. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 390 (2000). The creditors of the corporation know 
that they cannot reach the home or the personal bank account of the entrepreneur. On 
the other hand, these same creditors know that if the corporation has an account 
receivable, they will be able to reach it before either the entrepreneur or her personal 
creditors. See id. at 390, 393-95, 397 tbl.1 ("The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning 
is ... the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity's 
owners or managers."). 
66. See Barton H. Hamilton, Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of 
the Returns to Self-Employment, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 604, 622 (2000) (presenting evidence 
that "individuals are willing to enter self-employment despite a stream of future returns at 
least 35 percent less than that available as a paid employee"). 
67. William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Entrepreneurship and Household 
Saving, Advances Econ. Analysis & Pol'y, Vol. 4: No. 1, 2004, Art. 8, 22-23, at http:// 
www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=bejeap (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
68. See Thomas Dunn & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Financial Capital, Human Capital, and 
the Transition to Self-Employment: Evidence from Intergenerational Links, 18 J. Labor 
Econ. 282, 296-99 (2000) (finding from survey of young men that sons of self-employed 
parents are significantly more likely to become entrepreneurs than sons of parents with no 
self-employment history). 
69. See id. at 290 (finding that "36% of second-generation self-employed sons would 
be classified as entering a family business"). 
70. See id. at 296-99. A son's probability of becoming self-employed rises .015 
(relative to an average probability of becoming self-employed equal to .031) when either of 
his parents is self-employed. Id. at 299; see also id. at 297 tbl.6 (showing that effect is 
highly statistically significant). In other words, a parent's self-employment experience 
increases the son's probability of becoming self-employed by about 50%. The 
phenomenon is also independent of wealth. Self-employed parents are three times 
wealthier than non-self-employed parents, see id. at 292, and greater parental wealth 
increases the probability that a son will become self-employed, id. at 297-98. But the effect 
is modest. A $10,000 increase in parental assets raises the probability of a son's annual 
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Many small businesses fail each year. Indeed, over 30% of new start- 
ups close within two years; over 50% close within four years.71 The failure 
of the business, however, does not mean that the person who ran it re- 
turns to work for someone else never to try again; many are serial entre- 
preneurs. The founders of 20% to 30% of all small businesses have 
started other businesses in the past.72 Indeed, starting a business, then 
closing it, and beginning another is no more a failure than accepting one 
job, then leaving it, and going to another.73 There is an optimal amount 
of time to spend at one job before looking for another. The same is true 
for these owner-operators. Although patterns vary across industries,74 
one basic pattern emerges: The longer you are in business for yourself, 
the less likely you are to return to working for someone else.75 Serial 
entrepreneurship is the most persistent and most telling characteristic of 
small business bankruptcies. The entrepreneurs with business ventures 
that end up in Chapter 11 are overwhelmingly committed to self-employ- 
transition to self-employment by .0009. Given that the annual probability of transition is 
.031, this is a very small effect. Id. at 298. 
71. See, e.g., Amy E. Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment 
Dynamics Data, Monthly Lab. Rev., May 2005, at 50, 51, 52 chart 1, available at http:// 
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/05/ressum.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A 
recent study, using data from Columbus, Ohio, reports that about 60% of restaurants fail 
within their first three years. H.G. Parsa et al., Why Restaurants Fail, 46 Cornell Hotel & 
Restaurant Admin. Q. 304, 309-10 (2005). 
72. Based on a review of the entrepreneurship literature, Sarasvathy and Menon 
conclude that at least one-third of new firms are founded by entrepreneurs who have 
started businesses before. Saras D. Sarasvathy & Anil R. Menon, Failing Firms and 
Successful Entrepreneurs: Serial Entrepreneurship as a Temporal Portfolio 9 (Darden 
Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 04-05, 2003), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=571921 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). A smaller figure-20.6%-is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, based on its 
1992 survey of the Characteristics of Business Owners. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992 
Economic Census: Characteristics of Business Owners 102 tbl.12a (1997), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cbo-9201.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
73. Optimaljob search is the subject of a vast literature. See, e.g., Kenneth Burdett, A 
Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 212 (1978); Johnson, 
supra note 4; Boyan Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1246 
(1979); Jovanovic, Job Matching, supra note 4. 
74. Most obviously, startup costs vary by industry. Manufacturing, wholesaling, and 
retailing have relatively high capital intensity, including startup costs. Timothy Bates, 
Analysis of Young, Small Business Firms that Have Closed: Delineating Successful from 
Unsuccessful Closures, 20 J. Bus. Venturing 343, 351 (2005). Service industries, such as 
professional services, finance and insurance, and real estate, are skill-intensive and have 
relatively low startup costs. Id. In the construction industry, those who run their own 
businesses at one time regularly switch to working for someone else and then back to 
working for themselves again, depending upon the economy and the work that is available. 
Id. 
75. Indeed, using 1966-1981 data from the National Longitudinal Study of Young 
Men, Evans and Leighton found that the probability of exiting self-employment falls 
essentially to zero after eleven years. David S. Evans & Linda S. Leighton, Some Empirical 
Aspects of Entrepreneurship, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 525 (1989). 
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ment. Although they are not committed to any particular business, they 
are committed to being in business for themselves. 
Before we focus upon serial entrepreneurship explicitly, however, we 
first want to show how the data do not support the traditional account of 
Chapter 11. That account depends crucially on the existence of assets 
tied to a particular legal entity that are worth more if kept together, or 
worth more with the human capital of the entrepreneur or the relation- 
ships she has built over time. The next part of the Article turns to this 
question. 
II. ASSET SPECIFICITY AND GOING-CONCERN VALUE 
If the assets of a small business are worth more in the hands of the 
current owner than anywhere else and if Chapter 11 can help ensure that 
they stay together, then we can justify Chapter 11 on the ground that it 
preserves going-concern value.76 To the extent that the assets of a dis- 
tressed business are specialized and more valuable inside the business 
than outside it, Chapter 11 might prevent the dispersal of a business's 
assets when the best use of those assets is in that business. This Part 
shows, however, that Chapter 11 does not in fact serve this function. The 
typical, distressed small business in Chapter 11 has little in the way of 
business-specific capital. 
In the first subpart, we analyze the raw data for all of the businesses 
in our sample and offer two different tests of asset specificity. Both point 
to its absence in all cases but one, restaurants. The second subpart illus- 
trates this point with a case study of a typical nonrestaurant establish- 
ment. The concluding subpart looks at restaurants, the only type of case 
where asset specificity is potentially important. 
A. Two Empirical Tests of Asset Specificity 
A policy directed towards saving businesses makes sense only if social 
value is lost when a business dies. Social value is lost if the assets generate 
greater value in their current configuration than in a market sale. This 
difference-the 
"going-concern surplus"-exists only if the assets are 
worth more inside the business than anywhere else.77 Assets are some- 
times customized to meet a business's idiosyncratic needs or the needs of 
businesses in the same industry; examples include railroad tracks and 
brewery equipment. These specialized assets cannot be readily 
76. See infra Part II.A. 
77. For similar arguments, see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 685-93 (2003) [hereinafter Baird & 
Rasmussen, Twilight] (discussing impact of fungible assets and business relationships on 
going-concern value); Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at 768-77; 
Viral V. Acharya et al., On the Capital Structure Implications of Bankruptcy Codes 3-4 
(June 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=548523 (discussing effects of asset 
specificity on firm liquidation values). 
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redeployed by other businesses if the assets are business specific or by 
businesses outside the industry if they are industry specific. As a result, 
plant, equipment, and other specialized assets are relatively illiquid.78 
There are few buyers for the assets, and any potential buyers will value the 
assets significantly less than the seller does.79 A basic function of bank- 
ruptcy law is to protect these illiquid assets and give the business the 
chance to continue using them. If creditors seized and sold these assets, 
they would fetch only "fire-sale" prices, and the business's going-concern 
surplus would be destroyed.s0 
The liquidation of a corporation is often viewed as irreversible.8s 
Even if it were possible to resurrect the business by reacquiring or recreat- 
ing its specialized assets, it is costly to do so. Asset specificity, then, is 
central to traditional theories of Chapter 11. In the absence of business- 
specific or industry-specific assets, a business is not worth reorganizing. 
Because an outsider values the assets at least as much as they are worth 
inside the existing business, no value is lost if the business is liquidated. 
Indeed, liquidation in this case avoids the direct and indirect costs of 
Chapter 11.82 
Even a casual glance at the data suggests that Chapter 11 has little to 
do with preserving the value of small businesses as going concerns.83 The 
bulk of small businesses in bankruptcy-the contractors, the livery ser- 
vices, the retailers-are organized around the skills of the entrepreneur. 
The physical capital of these businesses consists of generic tools and 
equipment. The only significant asset is the human capital of the entre- 
78. Phillip G. Berger et al., Investor Valuation of the Abandonment Option, 42 J. Fin. 
Econ. 257, 261-62 (1996). 
79. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 
J. Fin. 567, 579-81 (1988) (showing that this effect raises cost of debt financing). 
80. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt 
Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47J. Fin. 1343 (1992). The authors show that 
when financial distress is correlated within an industry, bankruptcy law prevents inefficient 
liquidation of industry-specific assets. In the absence of bankruptcy law, these assets would 
be sold at fire-sale prices to lower-value users outside the industry; the assets will not be 
purchased by higher-valuing users within the same industry because they too are suffering 
distress and are therefore liquidity constrained. For empirical evidence supporting this 
theory, see Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of 
Commercial Aircraft Sale Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939, 966-68 (1998); Per Str6mberg, 
Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. 
Fin. 2641, 2669, 2675, 2679 (2000). 
81. This is implicit in the notion that Chapter 11 is needed to preserve going-concern 
value. See supra note 54. If liquidation is reversible, it is little or no threat to going- 
concern value. See, e.g., White, supra note 11, at 273 (presenting model in which firms are 
unlikely to reopen after shutdown). 
82. For recent work on these costs, see Bris et al., supra note 33, at 8-23. Again, we 
are focusing on the typical bankruptcy case, not the handful of cases involving tens of 
millions of dollars or more in assets. One can argue that asset specificity does not matter 
in large cases either. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at 
768-77. But that is not our focus here. 
83. See supra Table 4. 
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preneur, and it can be readily deployed in different businesses.84 Simi- 
larly, the relationships with suppliers, customers, and workers are tied to 
the entrepreneur, not to the business. However valuable they are, they 
are not at risk if the corporate entity ceases to exist. Absent serious li- 
quidity constraints, the photographer, electrician, lawyer, and restaura- 
teur can shut down one operation and open another and be just as pro- 
ductive. In this Part, we confirm this impression with two empirical tests. 
1. A Direct Test of Asset Specificity. - We begin with the standard test 
of asset specificity used in corporate finance literature.85 We measure the 
extent to which a business has invested in relatively illiquid assets, such as 
plant and equipment. The value of plant and equipment-and perhaps 
other specialized assets-is divided by total assets to form an index of 
asset specificity. The larger this index, the greater the importance of spe- 
cialized assets in a given business. This test is, of course, imperfect. It 
does not account for the possibility that some assets, like office furniture, 
may be customized in the case of some businesses but not others. None- 
theless, the direct test is illuminating and the results striking. 
TABLE 6: MEASURES OF ASSET SPECIFICITY FOR MEDIAN BUSINESS, 
CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 FILINGS 
Land & Nonoffice 
equipment Equipment equipment 
Industry (SIC No.) (% of assets) (% of assets) (% of assets) 
Construction (15-17) 12.1 10.0 7.8 
Manufacturing (20-39) 16.1 8.2 4.9 
Transportation (40-46) 1.1 1.1 0.0 
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50-51) 3.1 3.1 0.0 
Retail Trade (52-59) 16.3 13.7 1.3 
Eating and Drinking Places (58) 62.0 57.4 50.9 
Insurance Agents (60-64) 22.1 22.1 0.0 
Business Services (47, 4959, 70-79) 78.7 59.5 6.9 
Professional Services (80-89) 16.2 7.6 0.0 
ALL BUSINESSES 28.9 16.5 5.5 
ALL BUSINESSES EXCEPT EATING/DRINKING 17.1 10.6 2.2 
84. See infra Part II.A.2. 
85. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 78, at 261-62, 268-69 (characterizing assets by 
degree of specificity and computing specificity indices); Str6mberg, supra note 80, at 2664 
(same). 
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TABLE 7: ASSET SPECIFICITY OF MEDIAN BUSINESS, 1998 SSBF DATA FOR 
CORPORATIONS (UNWEIGHTED) 
Land & equipment Equipment 
Industry (SIC No.) (% of assets) (% of assets) 
Construction (15-17) 18.9 17.0 
Manufacturing (20-39) 29.9 29.6 
Transportation (40-46, 48-49) 41.5 38.3 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 11.0 9.8 
Retail Trade (52-57, 59) 13.7 11.8 
Eating and Drinking Places (58) 65.4 47.7 
Insurance Agents (60-64) 18.2 18.2 
Business Services (47, 4959, 70-79) 24.8 21.0 
Professional Services (80-89) 21.1 10.9 
TOTAL 21.8 19.0 
TOTAL WITHOUT EATING/DRINKING 20.2 17.9 
TABLE 8: MEASURES OF ASSET SPECIFICITY FOR MEAN BUSINESS, 
CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 FILINGS 
Land & Nonoffice 
equipment Equipment equipment 
(% of assets) (% of assets) (% of assets) 
Industry (SIC No.) (sd) (sd) (sd) 
Construction (15-17) 21.4 (28.08) 19.7 (28.51) 15.7 (25.35) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 33.6 (39.48) 25.2 (35.10) 22.1 (30.12) 
Transportation (40-46) 1.1 (1.51) 1.1 (1.51) 0.0 (0.00) 
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50-51) 3.7 (4.07) 3.7 (4.07) 0.6 (1.16) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 25.9 (27.10) 18.7 (16.95) 9.4 (14.17) 
Eating and Drinking Places (58) 61.3 (27.12) 55.8 (28.94) 53.9 (28.26) 
Insurance Agents (60-64) 18.3 (11.98) 18.3 (11.98) 3.1 (5.37) 
Business Services (47, 4959, 70-79) 65.7 (34.91) 54.2 (38.10) 34.4 (39.87) 
Professional Services (80-89) 40.9 (40.85) 20.1 (30.74) 5.1 (14.75) 
ALL BUSINESSES 40.6 (36.45) 31.9 (33.60) 22.9 (31.04) 
ALL BUSINESSES EXCEPT EATING/DRINKING 35.8 (36.79) 26.4 (32.31) 15.8 (27.16) 
TABLE 9: ASSET SPECIFICITY OF MEAN BUSINESS, 1998 SSBF DATA FOR 
CORPORATIONS (WEIGHTED) 
Land & equipment Equipment 
Industry (SIC No.) (% of assets) (sd) (% of assets) (sd) 
Construction (15-17) 28.2 (26.49) 25.0 (25.11) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 34.2 (26.46) 32.8 (25.75) 
Transportation (40-46, 48-49) 41.1 (34.38) 39.4 (33.94) 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 17.9 (21.48) 15.6 (18.65) 
Retail Trade (52-57, 59) 23.1 (24.38) 19.4 (20.95) 
Eating and Drinking Places (58) 57.6 (33.59) 47.2 (31.37) 
Insurance Agents (60-64) 27.0 (30.19) 25.6 (29.35) 
Business Services (47, 70-79) 34.3 (32.96) 30.6 (30.26) 
Professional Services (80-89) 31.0 (31.02) 28.7 (29.07) 
TOTAL 31.25 (30.07) 28.1 (27.84) 
TOTAL WITHOUT EATING/DRINKING 29.7 (29.11) 26.9 (27.20) 
Tables 6 through 9 present the results of this direct test. Tables 6 
and 8 present various indices of asset specificity for the median and mean 
business. The broadest definition of specialized assets would include 
land (real estate used for a gas station, for example, is costly to convert to 
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other purposes) and equipment. Using this definition, about 29% of the 
median business's assets are 
"specialized." This definition is overbroad. 
Land is rarely specialized; indeed, economists typically lump real estate 
together with other nonspecialized assets such as cash.86 Additionally, 
the 
"equipment" of a small business includes computers, chairs, desks, 
and other office equipment, none of which is specialized in any meaning- 
ful sense. The columns in Tables 6 and 8 show the effect of excluding 
these assets from the definition of "specialized" assets. Excluding land, 
the percentage drops to 16.5% for the median business. The estimates of 
asset specificity in our sample drop even further when we exclude office 
equipment. For the median business, the percentage drops to 5.5%. The 
means are larger under all these measures (40.6%, 31.9%, and 22.9% 
respectively). 
But even these numbers are upper bounds for the vast majority of 
businesses. They are heavily influenced by the presence of establish- 
ments in the eating and drinking (in which 50.9% of the assets of the 
median business consist of nonoffice equipment), construction (7.8%), 
and business services (6.9%) sectors, as the final columns of Tables 6 and 
8 illustrate. Exclude eating and drinking and the estimates fall to 2.2% 
for the median business and 15.8% for the mean business. If we also 
exclude construction and business services, the figures fall to 0.1% and 
9.8% respectively. 
Eating and drinking establishments have specialized assets (an issue 
we confront below), but construction and business services often do not. 
The estimates for these two sectors overstate the extent of business-spe- 
cific capital in excavators, drywallers, photographers, graphic designers, 
and similar establishments. The nonoffice equipment of the typical con- 
struction business consists of forklifts, hammers, excavation equipment, 
and other tools. Not only do these tools have thick resale markets, but 
many businesses lease the equipment from third parties.87 If an other- 
wise healthy business lost this equipment through theft or fire, it could 
buy or lease the equipment and continue, perhaps without even a break 
in operations.88 The same is true for business services, as we can see from 
one of the cases in our dataset. Advance Photo & Video Imagery was a 
photo processing shop that owned $45,000 worth of photo developing 
86. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 78, at 268-69 (characterizing land as less- 
specialized fixed asset); Str6mberg, supra note 80, at 2664 (characterizing land as 
"nonspecific asset"). 
87. Thick resale and leasing markets are hallmarks of low asset specificity (at the firm 
level); they show vividly that construction equipment has significant value in many 
different firms. These markets have become even more liquid because of the Internet. 
Online services include Heavy Equipment Sales, at http://www.heavy-equipment-sales.com 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2005), and American Contractors, at http://www.american 
contractors.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2005). 
88. For a sense of the variety of the services readily available (including daily rental of 
equipment), see NES Rentals, at http://www.nesrentals.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). 
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equipment (cameras, flash meters, film processors, and computers).89 
This accounted for 92% of its assets. Indeed, among business services in 
our sample, Advance Photo had the highest ratio of nonoffice equipment 
to total assets. Yet this equipment was not specialized.90 Indeed, it repre- 
sented only about half of the photo developing equipment used at the 
business and was not different in kind from the remaining equipment, 
and this remaining equipment was leased, a hallmark of low asset specific- 
ity.91 What we see at Advance Photo we find elsewhere as well. When we 
look closely at each business with a high fraction of assets invested in 
equipment, we find, in the main, fungible, standardized assets. 
Our estimates of asset specificity, then, are biased upward by the 
presence of a few businesses (such as Advance Photo) with high ratios of 
standardized nonoffice equipment to total assets. This bias has its largest 
effect on our estimates for the mean business; means are sensitive to out- 
liers. For this reason, the estimates for the median business-which are 
less vulnerable to outliers-are more reliable estimates of the significance 
of asset specificity in all businesses except restaurants. By this measure, 
the typical business has 2.2% of its assets invested in specialized equip- 
ment. In other words, the typical small business has a small, perhaps triv- 
ial, investment in specialized assets. Only restaurants present something 
of a special case, and, as we shall see,92 the case for specialized assets with 
significant value is hard to make even there. 
Interestingly, the picture is not much different when we look at 
healthier businesses in the SSBF sample.93 As Table 7 shows, about 22% 
of the median business's assets consist of land and equipment, which is 
slightly lower than the 29% figure in our sample. The difference narrows 
substantially if we exclude restaurants: The median business in the gen- 
eral population has about 20% of its assets invested in land and equip- 
ment; the figure is about 17% in our sample. Similarly, equipment makes 
up 17.9% of the median SSBF business's assets (excluding restaurants); 
89. Schedule B at 2, In re Advance Photo & Video Imagery, Inc., No. 98-27435 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1998). 
90. Motion of Pinnacle Bank for Modification of Automatic Stay at Exhibit D, In re 
Advance Photo, No. 98-27435 (showing that debtor's equipment included camera, flash unit 
and meter, camera bag, tape recorders, video editor/mixer, and densitometers). 
91. Debtor leased an enlarger, photo processor, monitor, recorder, mixer, printer, 
workstation, and other equipment worth over $160,000. See Proof of Claim Filed by First 
Sierra Financial, Inc., Exhibit A at 1-2, In re Advance Photo, No. 98-27435; Proof of Claim 
Filed by JLA Credit Corp. at 1, In re Advance Photo, No. 98-27435; Proof of Claim Filed by 
M&C Leasing Co., Schedule A at 1, In re Advance Photo, No. 98-27435; see also Schedule D 
at 1, In re Advance Photo & Video Imagery, Inc., No. 98-15534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 19, 
1998) (stating debtor estimated value of leased equipment in prior Chapter 11 filing). 
92. See infra Part II.C. 
93. Publicly traded businesses have significantly more in the way of specialized assets. 
In their study of publicly traded businesses, Berger et al. found a median of 31.9% of assets 
invested in plant and equipment. Berger et al., supra note 78, at 269 tbl.1 (reporting that 
"fixed assets" (plant, equipment, and land) account for 33.6% of assets in median business 
and that land accounts for 5.2% of "fixed assets"). 
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the figure for businesses in our population is about 11%. SSBF data do 
not allow us to distinguish between office equipment and nonoffice 
equipment. These results, however, suggest that the low levels of asset 
specificity observed in our data are not unique to distressed small 
businesses. 
2. An Indirect Test of Asset Specificity. - Tables 6 through 9 present a 
direct test of asset specificity that distinguishes between assets with highly 
liquid markets (cash) and those with less liquid markets (machinery). 
This simple test suffers many limitations. It does not identify businesses 
with assets that are sufficiently illiquid that they would generate "fire-sale" 
prices. It can only indicate whether some firms have more specialized 
assets than others. More importantly, the test can easily mischaracterize 
the specificity of particular assets. Land is nonspecialized in some cases, 
such as a vacant tract in an industrial park, and specialized in others, such 
as land in which a petroleum storage tank has been installed. Yet the test 
characterizes all land as either specialized or nonspecialized. Even office 
equipment can be specialized to serve the needs of a particular firm. It 
may, for example, be modified to serve the physical needs of the owner- 
operator. 
The limitations of the direct test suggest that we look for an alterna- 
tive test of the importance of business-specific or industry-specific assets. 
Instead of asking whether specialized assets are present in distressed busi- 
nesses, as the direct test does, we propose asking whether liquidation of 
assets-specialized or nonspecialized-is an irreversible event. If a busi- 
ness's going-concern value depends on specialized assets that are hard to 
recreate or reacquire after they have been sold off, liquidation should be 
irreversible or very costly to reverse. If we observe the opposite-that the 
owner-operator routinely recreates her businesses-we can conclude ei- 
ther that the business did not depend on specialized assets, or that, if it 
did depend on them, the owner-operator was able to reacquire the assets. 
For example, she may have been the high bidder at the liquidation auc- 
tion. Either conclusion seriously undermines the conventional case for 
Chapter 11. In the absence of specialized assets, there is no going-con- 
cern surplus to preserve or fire sale to avoid. If specialized assets are eas- 
ily reacquired after liquidation, Chapter 11 is equally irrelevant because 
owner-operators can preserve going-concern surplus without the law's 
help. By testing whether liquidation is irreversible, then, we look for the 
consequences of asset specificity. This "indirect" test complements the "di- 
rect" test of the previous subpart, which assesses the presence of asset speci- 
ficity through a simple but imperfect categorization of assets. 
We implement the indirect test by looking at the career histories of 
the owner-operators of businesses that filed Chapter 11 petitions. If 
owner-operators are able to establish new, similar businesses soon after 
their businesses are liquidated in Chapter 11, we infer that business-spe- 
cific assets are relatively unimportant or easy to reacquire. In either case, 
there is little support for the efficiency-based theory of Chapter 11. Simi- 
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larly, if the business in bankruptcy is one of many similar businesses estab- 
lished in the past by the owner-operator, we also infer that asset specificity 
is unimportant. We must also consider the possibility that the owner-op- 
erator will start a different kind of business after her business is liquidated 
in Chapter 11, and the possibility that she established different businesses 
in the past. Indeed, the literature on small-business entrepreneurs indi- 
cates that they may move between different kinds of businesses as they 
search for an optimal "match."94 If we see this kind of "business shop- 
ping," we can at least conclude that the owner-operator's human capital 
is not tied to the entity that is in Chapter 11. 
Tables 10 through 13 report the results of this indirect test. Table 10 
shows that, among businesses that were liquidated in bankruptcy ("shut- 
downs"), the owner-operator had founded a similar business before or 
went on to found a similar business in the future in nearly 80% of the 
cases. The percentage rises to 85% if we count any business founded by 
the owner-operator, regardless of its similarity to the business in our 
sample.95 
TABLE 10: WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED A SIMILAR OR 
DISSIMILAR BUSINESS BEFORE OR AFTER THE CHAPTER 11 CASE 
Started Dissimilar 
Started Similar Business Business Started Any Business 
% (n) (sd) % (n) (sd) % (n) (sd) 
Industry (SIC No.) Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases 
Construction (15-17) 77.8 (9) 20.0 (5) 66.7 (9) 20.0 (5) 88.9 (9) 40.0 (5) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 75.0 (4) 50.0 (8) 25.0 (4) 50.0 (8) 100.0 (4) 62.5 (8) 
Transportation 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 
(40-48) 
Wholesale Trade 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) (4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 100.0 (3) 63.6 (11) 66.7 (3) 36.4 (11) 100.0 (3) 81.8 (11) 
Eating/Drinking Places 57.1 (7) 66.7 (12) 14.3 (7) 25.0 (12) 71.4 (7) 83.3 (12) (58) 
Insurance Agents 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 
(60-69) 
Business Services 83.3 (6) 33.3 (12) 50.0 (6) 8.3 (12) 83.3 (6) 41.7 (12) 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional Services 100.0 (5) 83.3 (12) 0.0 (5) 41.7(12) 100.0 (5) 83.3 (12) (80-89) 
TOTAL 77.5 59.4 32.5 28.13 85.0 70.3 
(40) (64) (40) (64) (40) (64) 
(42.29) (49.50) (47.43) (45.32) (36.16) (46.05) 
94. See, e.g., Holmes & Schmitz, Turnover, supra note 3, at 1006-07 (using a 
matching model to explain various empirical regularities characterizing small businesses). 
95. These estimates, it should be noted, are lower bounds because they are based 
solely on data contained in records maintained by the Secretary of State of Illinois. We 
have not searched the records of other states to determine whether the entrepreneurs in 
our sample ever established out-of-state businesses. 
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The next three tables decompose the business experience of owner- 
operators. Table 11 focuses on their experience prior to the Chapter 11 
filing in our sample. It shows that between 45% and 47% of all owner- 
operators had founded at least one business that failed before they filed 
the cases in our sample. There is little difference between owner-opera- 
tors whose Chapter 11 filings led to shutdown ("failures") and those 
whose businesses survived the bankruptcy process ("successes"). Owners 
of failures were just as likely as owners of successes to have founded a 
similar (37.5% and 35.9%, respectively) or dissimilar (15.0% and 17.2%) 
business that failed in the past. 
TABLE 11: WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED A SIMILAR OR 
DISSIMILAR BUSINESS THAT FAILED BEFORE THE CHAPTER 11 CASE 
Started Dissimilar 
Started Similar Business Business Started Any Business 
% (n) (sd) % (n) (sd) % (n) (sd) 
Industry (SIC No.) Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases 
Construction (15-17) 33.3 (9) 0.0 (5) 33.3 (9) 20.0 (5) 44.0 (9) 20.0 (5) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 0.0 (4) 12.5 (8) 25.0 (4) 25.0 (8) 25.0 (4) 37.5 (8) 
Transportation 0.0 (2) 50.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 50.0 (2) 
(40-48) 
Wholesale Trade 0.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 
(4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 100.0 (3) 27.2 (11) 0.0 (3) 18.2 (11) 100.0 (3) 36.4 (11) 
Eating/Drinking Places 42.9 (7) 50.0 (12) 14.3 (7) 16.7 (12) 57.1 (7) 66.7 (12) 
(58) 
Insurance Agents 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 
(60-69) 
Business Services 33.3 (6) 16.7 (12) 16.7 (6) 8.3 (12) 33.3 (6) 25.0 (12) 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional Services 60.0 (5) 66.7 (12) 0.0 (5) 25.0 (12) 60.0 (5) 66.7 (12) 
(80-89) 
TOTAL 37.5 35.9 15.0 17.2 45.0 46.9 
(40) (64) (40) (64) (40) (64) 
(49.03) (48.36) (36.16) (38.03) (50.38) (50.30) 
Table 12 looks at the postbankruptcy experience of owner-operators. 
Among businesses that were shut down in bankruptcy, the owner-opera- 
tors went on to found another business in 50% of the cases. In about 
38% of the cases, the new business was similar to the one that was liqui- 
dated in bankruptcy. The percentages are, not surprisingly, much lower 
for owner-operators whose businesses survived the bankruptcy process. 
An owner-operator surely has less incentive to establish a new business if 
his or her existing business continues. 
Table 12, however, underestimates the frequency with which owner- 
operators start over again when their businesses fail. Many small entre- 
preneurs run multiple businesses simultaneously. Instead of increasing 
the size of the legal entity when opening a new outlet, the small entrepre- 
neur may put the new operation into an entirely separate corporation. 
Or the entrepreneur may diversify her business portfolio and establish a 
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completely different business, again in a new and freestanding corpora- 
tion. As with any diversification strategy, by owning multiple businesses, 
an entrepreneur effectively avoids the costs of starting over again when 
any one business fails; the death of any one business does not disrupt the 
others. 
TABLE 12: WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED A SIMILAR OR 
DISSIMILAR BUSINESS AFTER THE CHAPTER 11 CASE 
Started Similar Business Started Dissimilar Started Any Business 
% (n) (sd) Business % (n) (sd) 
% (n) (sd) 
Industry (SIC No.) Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases 
Construction (15-17) 33.3 (9) 20.0 (5) 11.1 (9) 0.0 (5) 44.4 (9) 20.0 (5) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 75.0 (4) 12.5 (8) 25.0 (4) 12.5 (8) 100.0 (4) 25.0 (8) 
Transportation 100.0 (2) 50.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 50.0 (2) 
(40-48) 
Wholesale Trade 50.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 
(4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 0.0 (3) 27.3 (11) 66.7 (3) 27.3 (11) 66.7 (3) 54.6 (11) 
Eating/Drinking Places 14.29 (7) 33.3 (12) 0.0 (7) 8.3 (12) 14.3 (7) 41.7 (12) (58) 
Insurance Agents 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 
(60-69) 
Business Services 33.3 (6) 8.3 (12) 33.3 (6) 0.0 (13) 50.0 (6) 8.3 (13) 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional Services 40.0 (5) 41.7 (12) 0.0 (5) 16.7 (12) 40.0 (5) 50.0 (12) (80-89) 
TOTAL 37.5 26.6 15.0 10.9 50.0 35.9 
(40) (64) (40) (65) (40) (65) 
(49.03) (44.52) (36.16) (31.46) (50.64) (48.36) 
Table 13 takes account of an entrepreneur's ability to "start over" 
either by founding a new business or by continuing other businesses 
when one fails. Owner-operators whose businesses were liquidated in 
bankruptcy started a new business or continued others in 70% of the 
cases. In 60% of the cases, the new or continued businesses were similar 
to the one shut down in Chapter 11. 
In short, 85% of the owner-operators in our sample are serial entre- 
preneurs. For those whose businesses were shut down in bankruptcy, this 
legal outcome was a nonevent: Seventy percent of them moved on to 
other businesses. The only effect of Chapter 11 was to delay the time 
when they moved on. Those who use Chapter 11, then, are dedicated 
serial entrepreneurs. They start new businesses at a rate much higher 
than the general population. A panel study of young men, for example, 
found that the probability of self-employment over a fifteen-year period 
was only 18% generally and 32% among sons of fathers who were once 
self-employed.96 But our findings are unsurprising given what we know 
about those who run their own businesses. The median business in our 
96. Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 68, at 286-89. 
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TABLE 13: WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED OR CONTINUED 
RUNNING A SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR BUSINESS AFTER THE CHAPTER 11 CASE 
Started or Continued 
Started or Continued Running Dissimilar Started or Continued 
Running Similar Business Business Running Any Business 
% (n) (sd) % (n) (sd) % (n) (sd) 
Industry (SIC No.) Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases Shutdowns Other Cases 
Construction (15-17) 55.6 (9) 20.0 (5) 44.4 (9) 0.0 (5) 66.7 (9) 20.0 (5) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 75.0 (4) 37.5 (8) 25.0 (4) 37.5 (8) 100.0 (4) 62.5 (8) 
Transportation 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 100.0 (2) 
(40-48) 
Wholesale Trade 50.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 
(4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 0.0 (3) 45.5 (11) 66.7 (3) 27.3 (11) 66.7 (3) 63.6 (11) 
Eating/Drinking Places 57.1 (7) 41.7 (12) 0.0 (7) 25.0 (12) 57.1 (7) 66.7 (12) 
(58) 
Insurance Agents 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (2) 0.0 (1) 50.0 (2) 100.0 (1) 
(60-69) 
Business Services 66.7 (6) 16.7 (12) 33.3 (6) 0.0 (13) 66.7 (6) 16.7 (13) 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional Services 80.0 (5) 50.0 (12) 0.0 (5) 16.7 (12) 80.0 (5) 58.3 (12) 
(80-89) 
TOTAL 60.0 39.1 22.5 17.2 70.0 51.6 
(40) (64) (40) (64) (40) (64) 
(49.61) (49.17) (42.29) (38.03) (46.41) (50.37) 
sample was about seven years old, as Table 2 showed, and about 40% of 
the entrepreneurs had founded businesses that failed before they filed 
the Chapter 11 petitions in our sample. Thus, a large fraction of the 
small-business owners in our sample had well over seven years of experi- 
ence in self-employment. Previous empirical work has shown that, for 
entrepreneurs with this much experience, the probability of exiting self- 
employment is very low.97 
These results reinforce the view that small businesses in bankruptcy 
possess little in the way of assets whose value depends upon their being 
kept together. Owner-operators face little or no difficulty in starting over 
again, taking their human capital and all the relationships they have es- 
tablished in their old business with them. Whatever benefit owner-opera- 
tors enjoy from the Chapter 11 process (such as a reduction in their per- 
sonal liability for the IRS obligations of the business), the outcome of a 
Chapter 11 proceeding-reorganization or liquidation-is largely irrele- 
vant to what they do in the future. The drywall contractor will continue 
to hang drywall; the stand-alone travel agent will remain a stand-alone 
travel agent. Their customers will continue to use them (or not) inde- 
pendent of the legal entity in which they choose to operate. 
97. In fact, the probability is zero among entrepreneurs with at least eleven years of 
experience. See Evans & Leighton, supra note 75, at 525. 
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B. A Case Study of Asset Specificity 
Nieman Industries was a maker of molded plastics for automobile, 
consumer products, computer, and electronic parts supply industries.98 
It was the first corporation to file a Chapter 11 petition in the Northern 
District of Illinois in 1998.99 Nieman Industries might seem an example 
of an unsuccessful Chapter 11. No disclosure statement was ever filed 
and the petition was dismissed without a plan of reorganization being 
proposed, let alone confirmed.100 At the end, the business had been 
stripped of all of its assets.'01 It might seem as if the entrepreneur would 
now have to turn elsewhere for his livelihood. He would no longer be 
able to run his own business in this industry. It turns out that, as in so 
many cases in our sample, this is emphatically not the case. 
Like the vast majority of small corporations in Chapter 11, there was 
no going-concern value. Nieman Industries, the corporation, was a col- 
lection of entirely fungible equipment'02 set up inside a nondescript 
building in an industrial park.'03 It could be reassembled in almost no 
time at small cost. The equipment, while expensive, had no special value 
in this corporation as opposed to another that makes plastic parts.104 In- 
98. Voluntary Petition, Amended Exhibit A at 1, In re Nieman Indus., Inc., No. 98- 
00356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1998). 
99. This can be verified using the "Cases Report" feature available on the Northern 
District's PACER website, at https://ecf.ilnb.uscourts.gov/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
100. Order Dismissing Chapter 11 at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. 
101. Illinois records indicate that Nieman Industries underwent "voluntary 
dissolution" on April 8, 1998. See Illinois Secretary of State Public Records, available at 
LEXIS, ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law Review). When the case was 
dismissed, leased equipment was returned to lessors and collateral was turned over to 
secured lenders. Telephone Interview with Richard Nieman, Vice President, Treasurer, & 
Dir., Nieman Industries (Sept. 25, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
102. The bulk of the debtor's assets consisted of two injection-molding machines and 
a forklift. These assets were leased, a hallmark of fungibility. See Schedule G-Executory 
Contracts and Unexpired Leases, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356 (listing leased equipment and 
vehicle); see also Motion to Compel Debtor to Assume or Reject Truck Lease, Exhibit B at 
B-7, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356 (setting out schedule of payments for leased equipment). 
The undiscounted sum of payments equals about $310,000; at a discount rate of 10%, the 
payments have a present value of about $236,000, far more than the value of any 
equipment that the debtor actually owned. The schedules indicate that the debtor owned 
some equipment of "[u]nknown" value, but it was certainly worth no more than the 
purchase money security interest (worth about $78,000) encumbering it. See Schedule B 
at 3, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356; Schedule D, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. 
103. Nieman Industries was located in Bensenville, home to the sixth largest 
industrial park in Illinois. See DuPage County Dep't of Econ. Dev., Village of Bensenville, 
at http://www.co.dupage.il.us/economicdevelopment/municipalities.cfm?docid=29 (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
104. To the extent that equipment for making plastic parts requires customized dyes, 
these would belong not to Nieman, but to Nieman's downstream customers. The idea that 
specialized equipment can be used in arms-length transactions in the market instead of 
being located within a particular business is one of the foundational ideas of industrial 
organization. Indeed, Nieman's business (a supplier of parts to, among others, auto 
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deed, Nieman leased the equipment it used to manufacture its plastic 
parts.'05 By the time of the Chapter 11, the most valuable asset in the 
enterprise was the owner-operator's set of relationships with various cus- 
tomers. Scott Nieman founded the business with help from his father'06 
(who ran his own plastic-molding business107) several years before, but 
his human capital was not business-specific. Scott had industry-specific 
human capital, and the challenge was one of creating a business that best 
matched this human capital. This asset did not belong to the corpora- 
tion. The creditors of the corporation had no right to Scott's human 
capital. This human capital-industry-specific, but not business-spe- 
cific-would exist regardless of whether the corporation continued, and 
the Chapter 11 process had no effect on it. 
Little is to be gained from keeping a business such as Nieman Indus- 
tries alive. In other words, the stakes in this case had nothing to do with 
the corporation, but everything to do with Scott and his specialized 
human capital. Nothing prevented him from walking away from the cor- 
poration, free either to start another business or to work for someone 
else. Indeed, those in Scott's position are often serial entrepreneurs. 
Scott's father was the owner-operator of a different business in the same 
industry. This alone makes Scott about three times more likely than the 
average person to run his own business.s08 By upbringing and tempera- 
ment, those in his position are willing to incur substantial costs and 
forego higher income elsewhere to run their own businesses. He is likely 
to keep starting businesses until he finds one that provides the best match 
with his human capital. 
It would be a mistake for the policies governing the reorganization 
of Nieman Industries to distort Scott's career choices-whether to con- 
tinue with the current business, start a new one, or work for someone 
else. Yet Chapter 11 as written allows judges to do exactly this. It can be 
interpreted in a way that induces Scott to tie his human capital to Nieman 
Industries, Inc., regardless of whether it makes sense. The automatic stay 
and other bankruptcy rules provide a chance to divert assets from lessors, 
landlords, and general creditors that make keeping this business afloat 
relatively more attractive than starting another.'09 
manufacturers) is the iconic example of such relationships. Coase was, of course, the first 
to understand this. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 388 (1937); 
see also R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43J.L. & Econ. 15, 
21-27 (2000). 
105. See supra note 102. 
106. His father was Vice President, Treasurer, Director, and owner of 41.7% of the 
corporation's stock. Statement of Financial Affairs at 6, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. 
107. His business, "The Mold Shop," was founded in 1984 and is ongoing, according 
to Illinois records. See Illinois Secretary of State Public Records, available at LEXIS, 
ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
108. See Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 68, at 289. 
109. In this case, Chapter 11 could have provided two sorts of distortions. First, it may 
have allowed Scott to keep the leased equipment and pay something less than he would 
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If given the chance to take advantage of Chapter 11 in this manner, 
Scott would be acting rationally, just as those who remain in a rent-con- 
trolled apartment that is too small or too far from work are acting ration- 
ally. Moreover, such interpretations of Chapter 11 make it more likely at 
the margin that someone in Scott's position will remain self-employed 
and not work for anyone else.10 But there is an economic distortion 
nevertheless. While it might be a good thing to encourage entrepreneurs 
like Scott to remain entrepreneurs, it is generally a bad idea to encourage 
them in a way that biases them towards keeping specific business ventures 
like Nieman Industries alive. 
There might be businesses that look on the surface like Nieman In- 
dustries but fit the profile of the traditional candidate for a corporate 
reorganization."' The equipment might have been specialized. A large 
group of creditors might have been closing in on the assets. The speed of 
the nonbankruptcy debt-collection process and an inability to renegotiate 
with everyone simultaneously might lead to a premature dismantling of 
the business. Chapter 11 might give the owner of the business time to 
form new contracts and put the business back on course. But these cases 
otherwise have to. Second, Scott had guaranteed a $78,000 secured loan from the bank. 
See Schedule D at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. By putting Nieman Industries in 
bankruptcy, Scott could ensure that whatever assets existed went to the bank rather than, 
let us say, to trade creditors, as would likely have happened if the business had continued 
to operate outside of bankruptcy. 
110. Small entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained. Using data on entrepreneurs 
between 1981 and 1985, one study found that a $100,000 inheritance increased the 
probability of becoming self-employed by 3.3% (from 19.3% to 22.6%). See Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin et al., Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints, 25 RAND J. Econ. 
334, 342 (1994). An entrepreneur is more likely to stay in business if he or she receives a 
bequest. Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and 
Liquidity Constraints, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 53, 69 (1994). Using data on entrepreneurs 
between 1981 and 1985, these authors found that a $150,000 inheritance increased the 
probability of survival by about 1.3 percentage points (the average probability of survival 
was 77.6%). Id. at 70-71. The implicit subsidy that Chapter 11 provides should work in 
the same way at the margin. 
111. We are, however, skeptical that many such businesses exist. We find vanishingly 
few in our sample or elsewhere. Our economy includes a dwindling number of firms that 
look anything like a railroad, or other exemplars of businesses with going-concern value. 
See Greg Ip, Mind Over Matter: Why Many Highfliers Built on Big Ideas Are Such Fast 
Fallers, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 2002, at Al (stating that fifty years ago, tangible assets 
represented 78% of assets of nonfinancial corporations; today that figure is 53%). The 
proportion of employees working in the service industries has more than doubled over the 
last thirty years. Compare U.S. Dep't of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics 61 (1977), 
with Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics 70 tbl.1-14 (Eva E. Jacobs ed., 7th ed. 2004). As of 
1997, more than twice as many people worked in service industries as in manufacturing. 
See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 544 tbl.867 (2000), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec17.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). The ability to outsource has also left even large-scale manufacturers 
less dependent on their own plants and equipment. More than a third of Boeing's latest 
airplane is being made in Japan. Peter Pae, Japanese Helping 787 Take Wing, L.A. Times, 
May 9, 2005, at C1. 
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are rare, as we showed in Part II.A, and Nieman Industries was not one of 
them. To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code is interpreted (as some 
advocate)112 to allow cases like Nieman to linger, we are not preserving 
going-concern value, but are instead distorting the career path of the 
owner-operator. 
At least in the Northern District, however, the Bankruptcy Code 
causes relatively little distortion of the small entrepreneur's career path. 
Judges are willing to make tough choices when the appropriate motions 
are put before them." When bankruptcy judges are willing to confront 
issues directly and resolve them quickly, Chapter 11 creates little or no 
distortion, and such was the case with Nieman Industries. One month 
after the filing, the equipment lessor moved to repossess the equip- 
ment;"14 the same day, the debtor moved to dismiss, admitting it was una- 
ble to effectuate a plan.115 Both motions were continued to a hearing 
one month later, when the judge dismissed the case.116 The corporation 
was dissolved under state law a few weeks after that.11"7 Scott no longer 
had a business that manufactured plastic parts, but nothing kept him 
from starting a new one that did exactly the same thing. But Scott's com- 
parative advantage lay in identifying those who needed plastic parts and 
matching them with those who could make them, rather than in manu- 
facturing the parts themselves. Scott's next business took advantage of 
his expertise and his relationships, but without the fixed overhead costs 
that doomed Nieman Industries. He became a successful supplier of cus- 
tomized plastic parts who subcontracted the actual manufacturing to 
others."l8 The court's willingness to take decisive action induced Scott to 
find a business that better matched his skills with the marketplace. It is 
no more desirable that Scott Nieman spend his life overseeing a manufac- 
turing operation than that Yo-Yo Ma play the violin."91 
112. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 22, at 117 ("Without chapter 11, it would be 
virtually impossible for the owner to continue his trade (as a lawyer, chiropractor, 
plumber, etc ... .) or to start another small business (like an insurance company or funeral 
home) unless he could discharge the business debts before attempting to sort out his 
personal debts."). 
113. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 11-16) (showing 
that over 60% of Chapter 11 filings were dismissed or converted to Chapter 7, that 
bankruptcy judges rendered over 40% of these orders within first three months of case and 
over 70% within first six months, and that "no party with a predictable bias-debtors or 
creditors-completely dominates the bankruptcy process; to the contrary, bankruptcy 
judges appear to play an important role in determining when a firm should be shut 
down"). 
114. Motion to Compel Debtor to Assume or Reject Truck Lease, In re Nieman, No. 98- 
00356. 
115. Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Chapter 11 at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. 
116. Order Dismissing Chapter 11 at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. 
117. See supra note 99. 
118. Telephone Interview with Richard Nieman, supra note 101. 
119. The analogy is Richard Thaler's. See Richard Thaler, Address: "Finding Your 
Cello," U. Chi. Rec., Nov. 6, 2003, at 7. As Thaler points out, Yo-Yo Ma began as an 
indifferent violinist and discovered his genius only when he switched to the cello. Id. If he 
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C. The Case of Restaurants 
Restaurants require large capital investments relative to other small 
businesses. An investment of $150,000 is needed to start even a modest 
fast-food operation, such as a mid-range Subway sandwich shop.120 One 
million dollars or more is needed to open a fine-dining restaurant. It 
might seem that these businesses fit the conventional account of Chapter 
11: They depend on specialized assets and may need the protection of 
Chapter 11 to ensure that the assets are not wasted and going-concern 
surplus destroyed. After all, a restaurateur cannot begin a new restaurant 
the way a travel agent or insurance broker can open a new office. 
Here again, however, matters are more complicated than they ap- 
pear. Restaurant kitchen equipment itself is not expensive.121 Indeed, 
the ovens and stoves used in restaurants cost less than high-end equip- 
ment for consumer use, as they have none of the insulation or finishes 
that home kitchens require. The ranges, ovens, and counters are often 
on wheels and in any event are readily moveable, and there is a robust 
secondary market for them. The capital costs lie elsewhere. First, con- 
verting generic retail space into space suitable for a restaurant is expen- 
sive. Merely meeting health code requirements for everything from hand 
sinks to grease traps to air vents can cost hundreds of thousands of dol- 
lars. But these investments are not tied to any particular restaurant ven- 
ture. A Mexican restaurant can use the same walk-in refrigerator as read- 
ily as an Italian restaurant. Of course, if it turns out that the location is a 
poor one for a restaurant, any money spent converting space dedicated to 
that use will be lost, but Chapter 11 can do nothing to change this. 
The build-out of the dining space can be costly. Moreover, it can be 
lost if a particular restaurant venture is shut down. While the kitchen of a 
three-star restaurant is barely distinguishable from one that serves the 
most pedestrian country club food, the dining rooms of such restaurants 
are different. These represent substantial capital investments that are 
tightly tied to the business plan of the owner-operator. Converting the 
decor of a dining room of an Italian restaurant to a seafood restaurant 
often runs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. These huge sunk 
expenditures, however, are incurred only by a minority of restaurants. 
While the d6cor of the upscale fine-dining restaurant can run into the 
millions, the typical restaurant (and the one that typically ends up in 
Chapter 11) is a modest affair. More to the point, the money invested is a 
had not switched when he did, he might never have excelled at either. Exactly when Yo-Yo 
Ma should have given up the violin admits of no easy answer. It is never easy to know when 
to switch jobs or form new businesses. But nothing suggests that we make things better 
with a legal rule that pushes the time forward or backward. 
120. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., Subway Franchise Capital Requirements (Oct. 2005), at 
http://www.subway.com/subwayroot/Development/05dev/financial/capital_US.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
121. This paragraph and the two following recap Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra 
note 77, at 685-89. 
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sunk cost. The value of the carpeting, wall cover, and eclectic furniture 
of a given restaurant turns entirely on the revenue they generate going 
forward. They have value only if they bring in business. 
TABLE 14: DEBT COMPOSITION OF BUSINESSES IN CHAPTER 11 
Secured debt as % of IRS debt as % 
Businesses total debt, among Businesses of total debt, among 
with bank businesses with with IRS debt businesses with IRS 
debt secured debt median % (freq) debt median 
Industry (SIC No.) % (n) (sd) (mean) (sd) (sd) (mean) (sd) 
Construction (15-17) 85.7 (14) 37.6 (36.9) 85.7 (14) 6.6 (11.1) 
Manufacturing (20-39) 50.0 (12) 65.1 (63.8) 36.4 (11) 8.6 (34.3) 
Transportation 25.0 (4) 25.6 (25.6) 33.3 (3) 0.6 (.6) 
(40-48) 
Wholesale Trade 100.0 (3) 52.1 (62.3) 33.3 (3) 6.5 (6.5) 
(4813, 50-51) 
Retail Trade (52-59) 57.1 (14) 41.8 (46.9) 41.7 (12) 1.5 (11.5) 
Eating/Drinking Places 26.3 (19) 26.7 (40.8) 68.4(19) 21.0 (25.0) (58) 
Insurance Agents 0 (3) NA 66.7 (3) 1.6 (1.6) 
(60-69) 
Business Services 50.0 (18) 41.6 (46.1) 56.3 (16) 22.6 (29.8) 
(47-49, 70-79) 
Professional Services 52.9 (17) 52.4 (51.7) 76.5 (17) 22.4 (30.3) 
(80-89) 
TOTAL 51.0 (104) 43.6 (47.1) 61.2 (98) 12.7 (22.0) 
(50.23) (25.36) (48.97) (24.94) 
Our data suggest that restaurants in financial distress are also in eco- 
nomic distress. Restaurants are so prone to fail that they often have no 
institutional lenders at all. As Table 14 illustrates, only 26% of restau- 
rants in Chapter 11 have any institutional debt, making this industry one 
of the least likely to have bank debt. Even among restaurants that do 
have bank debt, it accounts for only a quarter of the debt of the median 
business. Among businesses in other industries, it accounts for nearly 
half of the debt burden. With debt burdens so low, why are restaurants 
failing? It is because failing restaurants cannot pay for their ongoing op- 
erations. They are in financial distress because they are in economic dis- 
tress. Restaurants are, for example, among the most likely to have IRS 
debt (68%). And among those with IRS debt, unpaid taxes account for 
21% of total debt, a much higher percentage than we find in any other 
type of business outside of the services sector. 
Most restaurants in Chapter 11, then, have business models that have 
failed. They begin with little or no debt in the capital structure, and they 
get into trouble because they cannot even meet their operating expenses. 
The restaurant stays in business by stretching out payments to trade credi- 
tors, falling behind on payments to the landlord, and then invading the 
trusts established for withholding taxes. The restaurant's inability to pay 
creditors signals that it has no future as a going concern. The hard assets 
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may be specialized, but they are not worth saving on that account. Spe- 
cialized assets that cannot generate a positive cash flow are worthless; they 
are liabilities.122 
Three restaurants in our sample did reorganize successfully. They 
remain in business today. The Chapter 11, however, had little to do with 
preserving going-concern value. Consider, for example, the Chapter 11 
of a Subway sandwich shop that had been sold to a new owner only a few 
months before.'23 The owner-operator of a Subway sandwich shop was 
inexperiencedl24 and the business operated at a loss.125 Mistakes in- 
cluded hiring too large a staff and overpaying sales tax.126 The short time 
spent in Chapter 11 allowed him to fix these problems. He fired full-time 
workers and replaced them with a succession of part-time workers in addi- 
tion to other management changes.127 He proposed and confirmed a 
100% plan'28 and several years later sold the business to someone else'29 
and, as we have seen many times, went on to run another one.'30 
This entrepreneur's successful use of Chapter 11 is different from 
the usual story told about Chapter 11. The business had little in the way 
of specialized assets. The equipment in a Subway sandwich shop is usu- 
ally leased and is readily moved.131 The money needed to convert a 
leased storefront to a Subway franchise is small.'32 Indeed, it was suffi- 
ciently small that this business moved two doors down the street after the 
Chapter 11 ended.'33 Far from the assets being tied to a particular loca- 
tion, it was possible to close at one location on one day and open at the 
new one (with the same equipment) the next.134 There was no collective 
decisionmaking involved either, but rather tough decisions (such as re- 
placing all the permanent employees with part-time workers) that success- 
ful entrepreneurs need to make to survive. This case, unlike the over- 
122. See, e.g., SB North Group, Inc., No. 98-12609 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1998). 
123. In re TC Rests., Inc., No. 98-09502 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1998). 
124. First Amended Disclosure Statement of TC Restaurants, Inc. at 7, In re TC Rests., 
No. 98-09502 ("Debtor was new to the fast food industry. .. ."). 
125. Id. at 8 ("Debtor maintained its operations by using funds earmarked for the IRS 
and [Illinois Department of Revenue] for operating and rent related expenses."). 
126. Id. at 7. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1-2 (explaining that all creditors will be paid in full). 
129. Telephone Interview with Manager, Subway Restaurant (Nov. 11, 2002) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
130. See Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award at 2 & Exhibit C, Doctor's 
Assocs., Inc. v. Ciatteo, No. 1:03-cv-08241 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2003) (explaining that 
entrepreneur ran Subway Sandwich Shop in Tinley Park and leased the real estate 
beginning in January 2002). 
131. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., supra note 120 (indicating that equipment is leased from 
Subway company, known formally as Doctor's Associates, Inc.). 
132. The Subway headquarters estimates that leasehold improvements range from 
$45,000 to $100,000. Id. 
133. Telephone Interview with Manager, Subway Restaurant, supra note 129. 
134. Id. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 20:46:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2348 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:2310 
whelming majority of the other restaurants in the sample, had a business 
plan that was fundamentally sound. 
A similar theme emerges from the case of Taco Fiesta.'35 The 
owner-operator of a thriving Mexican restaurant opened another at a dif- 
ferent location that failed.'36 The business ended up owing the landlord 
at the second location almost $60,000.137 The owner-operator and a busi- 
ness partner were personally liable for this debt.'38 In this case, the chal- 
lenge the owner-operator faced was one of returning to his core compe- 
tence. He likely could have done this by walking away from this 
restaurant, filing his own personal bankruptcy petition, and starting a 
new restaurant. But it was marginally easier to keep running this restau- 
rant and use Chapter 11 to resolve disputes with the outstanding 
creditors.139 
Again, the problem in In re Taco Fiesta had little to do with preserva- 
tion of specialized assets. Instead it was a case in which the serial entre- 
preneur was able to match his human capital with a business by returning 
to the sound business embedded inside the one that failed. The Chapter 
11 succeeded not because it preserved going-concern value, but because 
it did not distort the entrepreneur's decisionmaking. He would have 
continued running Taco Fiesta even if the benefits of Chapter 11 were 
not tied to the business itself. 
As we show in Part III, this is the striking characteristic of the success- 
ful Chapter 11 reorganization. A successful business emerges only if the 
entrepreneur's skills are matched with a business already inside the ex- 
isting one. To be sure, Chapter 11 may reduce transaction costs in cases 
like In re Taco Fiesta. If an owner-operator successfully operates a business 
but fails in an effort to expand it, Chapter 11 can help him or her return 
to the old business. The net effect of Chapter 11, however, is unclear 
even here. The bankruptcy process comes with its own administrative 
costs. In any event, Chapter 11 rarely succeeds when there is no core 
business inside the existing corporate shell to which the entrepreneur 
can return. As we discuss in the next Part, the Chapter 11 process simply 
135. In re Taco Fiesta, Inc., No. 98-06239 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1998). 
136. Debtor's Disclosure Statement at 6, In re Taco Fiesta, No. 98-06239. 
137. Id. at 6-7. 
138. Id. at 7 (noting that debtor and its principal were named defendants in 
landlord's suit); Schedule H, In re Taco Fiesta, No. 98-06239 (listing business partner as 
codebtor on liabilities owed to landlord); see also Schedule F, In re Salud Cortez, No. 98- 
07714 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1998) (acknowledging debt to landlord in owner- 
operator's personal bankruptcy filing); Schedule F, In re Juan Corona, No. 98-06247 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1998) (acknowledging debt owed by business partner to landlord 
in personal filing). 
139. In this case, as in one other successful reorganization, the owner-operator filed a 
personal bankruptcy petition at the same time. See In re Salud Cortez, No. 98-07714. 
Personal bankruptcy petitions are relatively common at some point in the careers of the 
serial entrepreneurs in our sample. About forty percent filed their own personal 
bankruptcy petition at one time or another. 
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does not align itself with the needs of the serial entrepreneur in any other 
environment. 
III. WHY CHAPTER 1 1? 
In Part II, we showed that entrepreneurs rarely use Chapter 11 to 
preserve going-concern surplus. This Part asks why entrepreneurs use 
Chapter 11 at all. If the typical small entrepreneur is searching for the 
right match between her human capital and a business, why would she 
use Chapter 11 to remain with her financially distressed business rather 
than start a new one? The short answer is that she does not. Fewer than 
1% of entrepreneurs running a failing business turn to Chapter 11.140 
The typical small entrepreneur does not linger with a financially dis- 
tressed business. Entrepreneurs who try one business usually cut their 
losses and go on to start another when the first fails. 
Even so, the appropriate question is not why so few entrepreneurs 
use Chapter 11, but why any do, given that it does little or nothing to 
preserve going-concern value. Our study of the Northern District points 
to several possible answers: asset sales,141 bargaining leverage,142 tempo- 
rary liquidity,143 and renegotiation of personal guarantees.144 Asset sales 
are often accomplished more easily and efficiently in a Chapter 11 pro- 
ceeding than under state law. These cases, however, are only a minority 
of Chapter 11s.145 Most businesses enter bankruptcy not to avoid ineffi- 
ciencies cured by Chapter 11 but rather to exploit potential inefficiencies 
created by the Code, including the entrepreneur's enhanced bargaining 
power in disputes with a creditor, landlord, or some other third party.146 
140. Owner-operators shut down more than a million businesses each year. See 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, Custom Tables, at http:// 
data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=bd (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (showing that total closings of private establishments ranged from 
1.1 to 1.4 million per year between 1994 and 2004). By contrast, only around 10,000 file 
Chapter 11 petitions. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 1990-2002 Calendar Year 
Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter and District, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
bnkrpctystats/Bk2002-1990Calendar.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (reporting 8,000 to 15,000 Chapter 11 filings per year between 1994 
and 2002). Even this overstates the importance of Chapter 11, as many Chapter 11 filings 
involve individuals or represent multiple filings by related entities or serial filings by the 
same entity. 
141. See infra Part III.A. 
142. See infra Part III.B. 
143. See infra Part III.C. 
144. See infra Part III.C. 
145. Over the population of Chapter 11 cases as a whole, asset sales take place only in 
a minority. See infra Table 15. If we focus on larger cases, however, sales are more 
common and may take place in half the cases or more. See Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, 
supra note 77, at 675-76. 
146. See infra Table 15 (presenting evidence of this type of strategic behavior in Panel 
B). Many others have noted that entrepreneurs commonly use Chapter 11 for this 
purpose. See, e.g., Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small 
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 181, 207 (2000). Indeed, this 
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Yet another benefit of Chapter 11 is the availability of temporary liquidity: 
Upon filing a petition, the entrepreneur can suspend debt service and 
defer or cap breach-of-contract claims.'47 With this temporary liquidity, 
she can take steps to resurrect or reorient the business. Lastly there is the 
phenomenon of personal guarantees, which are ubiquitous in small busi- 
ness cases. Chapter 11 may offer an attractive venue for renegotiating 
these guarantees, perhaps because the bankruptcy petition is a way for 
the entrepreneur to credibly signal that her financial affairs have wors- 
ened to the point that renegotiation is necessary. 
The latter two attractions of Chapter 11-temporary liquidity and 
renegotiation of personal guarantees-come with a cost. They en- 
courage owner-operators to remain in existing business structures instead 
of founding new ones (or seeking employment). This lock-in effect dis- 
torts the career trajectories of entrepreneurs. Whether this distortion 
outweighs the benefits of Chapter 11 is unclear, but our data provide 
strong evidence that the lock-in effect is prevalent in small business bank- 
ruptcies. We present this evidence after exploring the reasons entrepre- 
neurs are drawn to Chapter 11 in the first place. 
A. Asset Sales 
For small businesses as well as large ones, Chapter 11 offers a way148 
for a financially distressed business to sell its assets free and clear of en- 
cumbrances and creditor claims'149 and then divide the proceeds among 
the claimants. As Panel A of Table 15 shows, in about 11% of the Chap- 
ter 11 petitions in the Northern District (eleven cases), the business en- 
tered bankruptcy to sell assets, with the bankruptcy judge typically serving 
as auctioneer, either by approving a motion to sell assets or by confirming 
a plan of reorganization that contemplated substantial assets sales. In 
about half of these cases (five cases), the business entered Chapter 11 
solely to sell itself as a going concern to the highest bidder. The remain- 
ing six businesses entered bankruptcy primarily to sell assets and use the 
proceeds to increase cash flow sufficiently to overcome their financial dis- 
tress. As Panel A indicates, for most of these businesses (five cases) the 
behavior was the impetus for many of the amendments to Chapter 11 that brought about 
the latest overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, ?? 431-445, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 87) 23, 
109-17 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
147. Bankruptcy's automatic stay suspends obligations to general creditors for the 
duration of the case. See 11 U.S.C. ? 362(a) (2000) (amended 2005). Prepetition 
obligations under executory contracts and leases are treated as ordinary claims in the event 
they are rejected and put in abeyance until assumption, something that may take many 
months. See id. ? 365. Damages under real property leases are capped under ? 502(b) (6). 
148. See 11 U.S.C. ? 363(b) (permitting sales outside ordinary course, after notice 
and hearing). 
149. See id. ? 363(f) (permitting sales "free and clear of any interest in [the] 
property," with some exceptions). 
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sale did not ensure a successful Chapter 11 by the traditional metric; they 
ended up in liquidation or with their cases dismissed. 
Using Chapter 11 to effect a sale of the assets is especially likely when 
one of the potential buyers identified before the bankruptcy is allied with 
the current owner-operator. The Chapter 11 process ensures that the 
sale brings top dollar and prevents self-dealing.150 Billy's Good Life Caf6 
illustrates how assets are sold in Chapter 11.151 Billy Moss had opened 
other restaurants before attempting the Good Life Caf6.152 He had to 
make a large capital investment to convert the space into the caf6 he 
desired.'53 When it failed, there was no possibility of a going-concern 
sale. Any restaurant on this site (even one run by Billy) would have to 
change the decor, the menu, and the market niche in order to succeed. 
Nevertheless, any new restaurant would be able to take advantage of the 
investment already made in converting the space into a restaurant. As a 
serial entrepreneur, Billy Moss might be the one who put the highest 
value on this space. Outside of bankruptcy, however, neither Billy nor a 
group allied with him could acquire the asset from the corporation and 
be confident that they could take it free from the debts of the existing 
business.154 Chapter 11, however, provides a mechanism that allows Billy 
to bid for the asset and take it free of the claims of the creditors in the 
event he turns out to be the person who values it the most. As it hap- 
pened, another group proved to be the high bidder.'55 Like the Good 
Life Caf6, the restaurant it opened failed too.1'56 The space finally be- 
150. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at 786-88 (emphasizing 
efficiencies of asset sales within Chapter 11). 
151. In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1998). 
152. See Jodie Jacobs, The Good Life Starts with Eating Well, Chicago Trib., Nov. 3, 
1996, at Tempo 5. 
153. Debtor's schedules indicate that it received over $700,000 in secured financing. 
In light of the fact that debtor filed its petition less than two years after opening its doors, it 
seems likely that most of this financing was used to convert the space into a caf6. See 
Schedule D at 2, In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120; Jacobs, supra note 152 (noting that 
Billy's Good Life Cafe opened its doors in August 1996). 
154. And a group allied with Billy did want to purchase the restaurant. In bankruptcy, 
the top bid for the business was submitted by Billy's brother-in-law (Billy's wife was the 
restaurant's president). See Emergency Motion to Stay Order Dated August 3, 1998 at 1, 
In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120; Motion for Authority to Sell Assets Pursuant to Section 
363 of the Bankruptcy Code and for Other Relief at 3, In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120. 
The bid failed, however, because it was opposed by the caf6's landlord. Motion for 
Authority, In re Good Life Enters., at 2. 
155. See Order Finding that [sic] the Wong Group to be a Good Faith Purchaser and 
Granting Other Relief, In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120. 
156. The Wong Group founded Good Life Entertainment, LLC, on August 21, 1998. 
According to Illinois Records, the corporation had dissolved in 2001. See Illinois Secretary 
of State Public Records, available at LEXIS, ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
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came a successful restaurant (serving Mexican food) under its third 
owners.157 
For both large cases and small, Chapter 11 is becoming the platform 
that allows the sale of assets free and clear of old claims and encum- 
brances. If one were designing a legal system from scratch, it is not obvi- 
ous that one would want a mechanism originally designed for restructur- 
ing nineteenth century railroads to provide the avenue for a going- 
concern sale of assets.'58 Nevertheless, Chapter 11 seems to work effec- 
tively in this environment. 
B. Bargaining Power 
TABLE 15: REASONS FOR FILING CHAPTER 11 PETITIONS, BY 
CASE OUTCOME 
Shutdowns Restructurings Going 
& Dismissals Reorganizations without a Concern Sales All Cases 
(n=65) (n=23) plan (n=8) (n=8) (n=104) 
% (freq) % (freq) % (freq) % (freq) % (freq) 
Panel A: Types of Chapter 11 
Filings 
Asset sales 7.7 (5) 12.5 (1) 62.5 (5) 10.6 (11) 
Exploiting bargaining power 13.8 (9) 50.0 (4) 12.5 (13) 
Lock-In 49.0 (51) 
Traditional Chapter 1 is 26.9 (28) 
Panel B: Evidence of Lock-In 
Ignoring procedural 60.0 (39) 12.5 (1) 38.5 (40) 
requirements 
Failing to pay ongoing 26.2 (17) 16.3 (17) 
expenses 
Using Ch. 11 to favor 1.5 (1) 1.0 (1) 
insider-creditors 
Any evidence of Lock-In 76.9 (50) 12.5 (1) 49.0 (51) 
Panel C: Evidence of 
"Traditional Cases" 
Overexpansion 7.7 (5) 47.8 (11) 12.5 (1) 25.0 (2) 18.3 (19) 
Prepetition fraud or other 7.7 (5) 37.5 (3) 7.7 (8) 
malfeasance 
Cash shortages from loss of 9.2 (6) 13.0 (3) 12.5 (1) 9.6 (10) 
customers 
Cost overruns from 3.1 (2) 13.0 (3) 25.0 (2) 6.7 (7) 
reconfiguring business 
Asbestos liability 4.3 (1) 1.0 (1) 
Any Traditional Event 27.7 (18) 78.3 (18) 50.0 (4) 62.5 (5) 43.3 (45) 
Traditional Events, 7.7 (5) 78.3 (18) 12.5 (1) 37.5 (3) 26.0 (27) 
excluding sales, lock-in, etc. 
157. The authors obtained this information by contacting the Bannockburn Village 
Hall on October 4, 2002. This story is not unusual. For an example of a restaurant that 
went through five incarnations (and two bankruptcies) before finding its niche, see Baird 
& Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 77, at 687-89. 
158. On the railroad origins of Chapter 11, see Skeel, supra note 10, at 48-70. 
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Some entrepreneurs are drawn to Chapter 11 because it gives them a 
unique opportunity to extract concessions from creditors. In at least thir- 
teen cases in our sample (12.5%), as Panel A of Table 15 shows, the 
owner-operators filed a petition to exploit their leverage vis-t-vis land- 
lords and other claimants.'59 In many other cases, exploitation of bar- 
gaining power was an important part of the reason for filing. 
Consider, for example, In re Myron & Phil's Steak House.160 The own- 
ers fired two employees, who subsequently brought suit. One alleged sex- 
ual harassment and age discrimination; the other racial discrimina- 
tion.161 The first case went to trial, but less than fifteen minutes after it 
began, the owners put the restaurant in Chapter 11.162 This well-estab- 
lished restaurant had few problems other than these disgruntled employ- 
ees. The Chapter 11 changed the dynamics of the negotiations between 
the owner-operators of the business and the employee. Once the lawsuit 
was settled, the case was dismissed.163 
Another case in which Chapter 11 was used to change bargaining 
dynamics is In re ABO Taxicab.164 In this case, the creditor that had fi- 
nanced the purchase of the medallions threatened to levy on the as- 
sets.165 As in In re Myron & Phil's, no other creditors were in the pic- 
ture.166 The Chapter 11 again changed the bargaining dynamics and 
once the parties reached agreement, the case was dismissed. As in so 
many other Chapter 11 cases, there were no business-specific assets, and 
the entrepreneur was able to and did in fact start many other busi- 
nesses.167 Indeed, the entrepreneur in ABO started at least ten other cab 
159. We coded a case as "exploiting bargaining power" when the debtor remained in 
Chapter 11 only as long as necessary to reach a compromise with a single creditor (usually 
a tort victim or landlord) or when the primary issue in the case was a dispute with a 
landlord, which typically had commenced eviction proceedings prior to the filing. 
160. In re Myron & Phil's Steak House, Inc., No. 98-00726 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 
1999). 
161. Disclosure Statement at 4, In re Myron & Phil's, No. 98-00726. 
162. Emergency Motion to Lift Automatic Stay at 1-2, In re Myron & Phil's, No. 98- 
00726. 
163. Motion to Shorten Notice Under Bankruptcy Rule 2002(4) and to Dismiss 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy at 2, In re Myron & Phil's, No. 98-00726. 
164. In re ABO Taxicab Ass'n, No. 98-23646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1998). 
165. We infer this from the debtor's motion to dismiss, which states that "[t]here is 
only a single Creditor in this case" and "[s]ince . . . filing Debtor and Creditor have 
reached an agreement on the subject of liabilities." Motion for Dismissal of Case for Cause 
Under Section 1112(b) at 1, In re ABO Taxicab, No. 98-23646. Debtor, then, filed this 
Chapter 11 petition to buy time and obtain leverage in negotiations with the creditor. 
166. Id. 
167. The owner-entrepreneur's other businesses included First ABO Taxicab, A. Adu 
Cab Co., Afrique Transportation, Inc., Alop & Associates, Inc., Buskie Cab Co., G. Money 
Cab Co., Micro Cab Co., Nataco International, Osko Cab Co., 5165 Taxi Corp., and 5280 
Yiadom Cab Inc. Some of these businesses are mentioned in Motion to Consolidate at 2, 
In re First ABO Taxicab, Inc., No. 03-36193 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2003); others are 
documented in the Illinois Secretary of State Public Records, available at LEXIS, ILREC 
Database (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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companies, one of which also entered Chapter 11, again resolving a dis- 
pute with the creditor who had financed the purchase of the 
medallions.168 
Some cases involve both a sale and a strengthening of the bargaining 
hand. M&V Corp.169 Was a family-run music and video retailer founded 
January 31, 1983.170 It entered Chapter 11 so it could sell a piece of real 
estate upon which state tax authorities would have otherwise fore- 
closed.171 Once the sale took place, the case was dismissed.172 The busi- 
ness itself subsequently closed,73 but there was again no particular going- 
concern surplus associated with it. The owner-operator then directed his 
attention to a different music and video store-his third (at least).174 
In part because of the special treatment of leases and executory con- 
tracts,175 entrepreneurs sometimes use Chapter 11 to improve their posi- 
tions with their landlords or parties with whom they have long-term con- 
tracts. One case, for example, involved a Greek restaurant that had fallen 
behind on its rent.176 Its landlord had the chance to sell the underlying 
real estate to a third party. By filing for bankruptcy and curing the de- 
fault, the restaurant ensured that it could share in the premium that the 
landlord obtained from the sale.177 
168. In re First ABO, No. 03-36193. 
169. In re M&V Corp., No. 98-14680 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998). 
170. See Statement of Financial Affairs at 3, In re M&V, No. 98-14680 (indicating that 
Jeanne and Edward Carter owned and managed business); Voluntary Petition at 1, In re 
M&V, No. 98-14680 (indicating that M&V Co. was "music and video enterprise"); Illinois 
Secretary of State Corporation and LLC Information, available at LEXIS, ILREC Database 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating founding date of corporation). 
171. Motion for Authority to Sell Real Property at 1-2, In re M&V, No. 98-14680. 
172. Order Dismissing Case at 1, In re M&V, No. 98-14680. 
173. Illinois records indicate that the business failed to file an annual report in 1999; 
as a result, in June 2000, the state coded the business as "dissolved." Illinois Secretary of 
State Public Records, available at LEXIS, ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
174. Illinois records indicate that Edward Carter founded Metro Music Corp. in 
December 1971 and Metro Records, Inc. in February 1997. Both businesses failed to 
submit 1999 annual reports to the state and were coded as "dissolved" in May and July 
2000, respectively. See id. 
175. See 11 U.S.C. ? 365 (2000). For an overview of executory contracts and leases, 
see Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy, supra note 37, at 109-29. 
176. In re Acropolis, Inc., No. 98-27045 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1998); see also 
Motion for Authority to Assume Executory Lease at 2, In re Acropolis, No. 98-27045 
("Acropolis was in default under the terms of the [real estate] lease ... ."). 
177. The purchaser would not buy the land unless Acropolis rejected its lease and 
surrendered possession of the premises. Acropolis used this condition to its advantage, 
forcing the landlord-seller to pay $154,000 in exchange for its commitment to reject the 
lease and move out. See Motion of Debtor in Possession to Reject It's [sic] Executory 
Lease at 2, In re Acropolis, No. 98-27045. 
When Chapter 11 can be used to capture such substantive benefits, we should be 
aware that it will have an effect on bargaining that takes place outside of bankruptcy. A 
debtor who can credibly threaten to invoke section 365 in bankruptcy should be able to 
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C. Liquidity, Guarantees, and Lock-In 
Asset sales and simple exploitation of bargaining power account for 
only about 23% of the sample. For the remaining cases, Chapter 11 
largely serves as a venue in which a small-business owner can (tempora- 
rily) fend off landlords and trade creditors, increase short-term cash flow, 
and cut deals with large creditors-usually secured lenders and the IRS- 
to whom the owner had given personal guarantees of the business's in- 
debtedness.178 Thanks to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay and pri- 
ority rules,179 a small business can operate in bankruptcy free from credi- 
tor collection efforts and is barred from servicing its debt until a plan of 
reorganization is confirmed. Additionally, the business can assume prof- 
itable executory contracts, reject (i.e., breach) unprofitable ones, and de- 
fer paying breach-of-contract damages until a plan is confirmed (and, in 
the case of real estate leases, these damages will be capped).s18 These 
provisions of the Code improve a small business's liquidity, at least for a 
short while, largely at the expense of unsecured creditors and landlords. 
1. Temporary Liquidity. - Liquidity is an important determinant of 
the lifespan of small businesses. While starting a new business is not 
costly,181 it is not costless either. Owner-operators do not have ready ac- 
cess to credit markets. The risks associated with any new business are 
large and much of the money needed to start the business is not recover- 
able unless the business succeeds.'82 For outside investors, the costs of 
gathering enough information to distinguish the bad risks from the good 
are too large. Moreover, the owner-operators who run these businesses 
enjoy substantial nonmonetary returns. They are willing to accept less 
income and fewer prospects for growth in income to run the business.l83 
capture the benefits in bargaining with the landlord or contracting party without actually 
having to file. 
178. A promise not to file for bankruptcy is ordinarily unenforceable. See United 
States v. Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting "the general rul[e] 
that a debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition"). Exceptions 
typically arise only when there is a comprehensive workout outside of bankruptcy. See, 
e.g., In re Colonial Ford, 24 B.R. 1014, 1020 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). Hence, the distortions 
Chapter 11 introduces cannot be cashed out in advance through Coasean bargaining. 
179. See 11 U.S.C. ?? 362, 507. As a general matter, payments to general creditors are 
forbidden during the pendency of the case. See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
180. In the case of real estate leases, these damages will be capped. See 11 U.S.C. 
?? 365, 502(b) (6). 
181. Using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, a survey of 
individuals preparing to start new businesses, a recent study found that the median 
estimated startup cost was $6,000 for solo ventures and $20,000 for ventures founded by 
teams of entrepreneurs. Blade Consulting Corp., Expected Costs of Startup Ventures 1-2 
(2003), at http://sba.gov/advo/research/rs232tot.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
182. Over thirty percent of new businesses fail in their first two years. See Knaup, 
supra note 71, at 51. 
183. Hamilton, supra note 66, at 622. 
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The psychic benefits they enjoy do not form the basis on which outsiders 
make investments. Thus, owner-operators are more likely to keep run- 
ning their own businesses if they receive an inheritance.184 At the mar- 
gin, anything that makes running a particular business cheaper will make 
an entrepreneur more likely to remain with that business. 
2. Personal Guarantees. - In addition to providing short-term liquid- 
ity, Chapter 11 offers a venue in which the entrepreneur can strike deals 
with creditors to whom she will be personally liable if the business fails to 
repay them in full. The vast majority of small businesses (85%, as shown 
in Table 17 below) will enter bankruptcy with debts that have been per- 
sonally guaranteed by the owner-operator. These debts are generally 
owed to secured lenders and the IRS, both of whom are willing to renego- 
tiate the debts and the personal guarantees if the entrepreneur brings 
her business into bankruptcy.a85 This is true for several reasons. First, 
and perhaps most importantly, the bankruptcy process is a form of "costly 
state verification," much like an audit in the insurance context.'86 
Outside of bankruptcy, creditors have imperfect information about the 
value of the business's assets; although they may be willing to renegotiate 
the debts of the business and its entrepreneur, they may not trust the 
entrepreneur's representations regarding asset value. The bankruptcy 
process offers a mechanism for overcoming this information asymmetry, 
allowing creditors to verify (and entrepreneurs to demonstrate credibly) 
the value of the business's assets.'87 
In theory, these benefits might justify the Chapter 11 process. But to 
make such a case for Chapter 11, it must be proven that alternative mech- 
anisms cannot serve the same purpose at lower cost. Such proof is impor- 
tant because the costs of Chapter 11-particularly the lock-in effect-may 
be of little or no concern to banks, the IRS, and others interested in veri- 
fying the business's condition. Chapter 11 offers them a court-subsidized 
venue in which to achieve the same negotiations that they might under- 
184. An entrepreneur is more likely to start a business if he or she has greater 
personal wealth or receives bequests. See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, 
What Makes an Entrepreneur?, 16 J. Lab. Econ. 26, 35-43 (1998); Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, 
supra note 68, at 292-94; Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 110, at 342-46. 
185. The IRS generally does not pursue delinquent withholding taxes against an 
individual responsible for them while the Chapter 11 of the corporation is pending, nor 
while it is making payments under a plan of reorganization. See IRS, Internal Revenue 
Manual, 5.7.4.8.3, Trust Fund Taxpayer in Bankruptcy (Apr. 1, 2005), at http:// 
www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch07s04.html#d0e59602 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
186. There is a vast literature on costly state verification and its various applications. 
The literature was launched by Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive 
Markets with Costly State Verification, 21J. Econ. Theory 265 (1979). For a brief overview, 
see Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory 190-97 (2005). 
187. See, e.g., Bolton & Dewatripont, supra note 186, at 190 ("Viewed from the [costly 
state verification] perspective, the main function of bankruptcy institutions is to establish a 
clear inventory of all assets and liabilities and to assess the net value of the firm."). For 
formal models illustrating this function, see Giammarino, supra note 28, at 35-36; Webb, 
supra note 28, at 285-87. 
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take outside of bankruptcy. And the costs of this process are borne pri- 
marily by others, including unsecured creditors, who typically receive lit- 
tle or nothing from the reorganization process.g88 It is not possible to 
justify Chapter 11 as it currently exists because of the liquidity or the ver- 
ification mechanism it provides without taking these lock-in costs into 
account. 
For serial entrepreneurs, the opportunity to renegotiate personal 
guarantees often drives the Chapter 11 process. Old debts to banks and 
the IRS may hamstring efforts to start a new business. Although a per- 
sonal Chapter 7 filing could discharge these debts, it is unattractive be- 
cause the filing will have a negative effect on the entrepreneur's credit 
rating'89 and will preclude another filing within the next six years (eight 
years under the new legislation).190 Other reasons could, of course, be 
offered for the attractiveness of bankruptcy as a venue for renegotiating 
guarantees. The process of renegotiating a guarantee, for example, may 
give secured creditors and the IRS leverage over the Chapter 11 process. 
Most owner-operators have little wealth to satisfy personal guarantees; the 
typical entrepreneur has invested about half of her assets in her busi- 
ness.'9' There is little, then, a creditor will gain from enforcing a per- 
sonal guarantee in state courts. But enforcement will impose high costs 
on owner-operators, who may be forced to file individual bankruptcy peti- 
tions. These costs give creditors bargaining power, which may be useful 
during Chapter 11 proceedings, particularly because our data suggest 
that the remaining creditors play a small or nonexistent role in the vast 
majority of small business bankruptcies. 
3. Labor Market Consequences: Evidence of Lock-in. - Together, in- 
creased liquidity and opportunities to renegotiate personal indebtedness 
make Chapter 11 attractive to small business entrepreneurs. It allows the 
entrepreneur to remain with a failing business for a while longer. In the 
interim, she can hope that the business will turn around. In the absence 
of Chapter 11, she would typically set out to open a new business that is a 
better match with her human capital. But, with Chapter 11, continuing 
188. See Douglas G. Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: 
An Empirical Study 22-23 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) [hereinafter Baird et al., Dynamics] (collecting data from Southern District of 
New York and District of Arizona and finding that nonpriority unsecured creditors receive 
only 3% of value of their claims in cases involving firms with assets worth less than 
$200,000; recovery rises to 33% in cases involving firms with assets worth more than $1 
million). 
189. See generally Jonathan Fisher et al., Is the Bankruptcy Flag Binding? Access to 
Credit Markets for Post-Bankruptcy Households, Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meeting, 
2004, Paper 28, available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041& 
context=alea (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (examining effect of bankruptcy 
declaration after the bankruptcy no longer appears on the bankrupt's credit report). 
190. 11 U.S.C. ? 727(a)(8) (2000); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, g 312, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 87) 23, 
86-87 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
191. See Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 67, at 22-25. 
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with the old business is costless while starting a new one is not. To the 
extent she can delay incurring those costs, she is better off. The Code in 
these cases provides the most straightforward kind of lock-in effect. 
Nearly 50% of the filings exhibit strong evidence of lock-in.192 When 
the owner-operator is not complying with even its most basic ground 
rules, let alone trying to put together a viable plan of reorganization, 
Chapter 11 is most likely doing little more than subsidizing a failed busi- 
ness. When the owner-operator violates an explicit order of the court, 
fails to attend the mandatory meeting with the creditors,193 or neglects to 
fill out the forms listing the business's assets and liabilities,"94 we can 
safely infer that she is merely playing a waiting game. These cases consti- 
tute about 39% of all the bankruptcy petitions filed in the Northern Dis- 
trict in 1998, as shown by the row labeled "Ignoring Procedural Require- 
ments" in Table 15. They make up 60% of all cases that ended with 
shutdown or dismissal. Another important indicator of lock-in is whether 
the owner-operator used Chapter 11 to avoid paying not just outstanding 
debt but also ongoing expenses.'95 We see this indicator in about 16% of 
the cases overall and 26% of cases ending in shutdown or dismissal.'96 
These are just the most obvious indicators of lock-in. Many others could 
be proposed, such as the use of Chapter 11 to divert payments to insider- 
creditors (found in one case in our sample). 
Chapter 11, then, allows the entrepreneur to play for time. An 
owner-operator often files a Chapter 11 petition to prevent suppliers 
from terminating resale or licensing agreements.197 Then it ignores pro- 
cedural requirements or stops paying ongoing expenses, all in a bid to 
resurrect the business. Evidence that Chapter 11 is used for purposes of 
delay is present in about 50% of all cases and 77% of all shutdowns and 
dismissals.198 In these cases, Chapter 11 induces the owner-operator to 
remain with the business too long. Our point here is not the familiar one 
that a Chapter 11 filing thwarts creditors. In most of these cases, there 
192. See supra Table 15. 
193. 11 U.S.C. ? 343 ("The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under 
oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341 (a) of this title."). 
194. Id. ? 521(a) (1) (obligating debtor to prepare reports detailing, among other 
things, assets and liabilities and current income and expenditures). 
195. We observed this indicator when creditors or the U.S. Trustee moved for 
dismissal (or relief from the automatic stay) because the debtor was not paying ongoing 
expenses or court-ordered adequate protection, or when the debtor admitted (typically in 
a motion to dismiss) that revenues did not cover operating expenses. 
196. See supra Table 15 (listing these cases in row labeled "Failing to pay ongoing 
expenses"). 
197. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition, Form 1 at 1, In re Wireless Cellular, No. 98-24725 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1998) (using Chapter 11 to delay termination of reseller 
agreement between debtor cellular airtime wholesaler and Ameritech); Voluntary Petition, 
Form B1 at 1-2, In re Cooper & Soble Ins. Agency, No. 98-20198 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.June 30, 
1998) (using Chapter 11 to delay termination of debtor's license to sell insurance). 
198. See supra Table 15. 
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was little for the creditors in any event.'99 Rather, Chapter 11 delays the 
owner-operator's transition from an existing venture to a new one that 
better matches with his or her skills.200 But we should be careful not to 
overstate the costs that Chapter 11 imposes. Cases in which the owner- 
operator is simply using Chapter 11 to keep a failing business around 
longer are not hard for able judges to identify. Generally, within a few 
weeks a creditor or a landlord brings a motion to dismiss, and the case 
itself leaves the system quickly, typically within three months.201 Thus it is 
not surprising that so few failing businesses actually file bankruptcy 
petitions. 
So far, we have looked at lock-in without reference to those cases in 
which the debtor is able to confirm a plan of reorganization. An initial 
look at the data might suggest that lock-in is not a large issue in these 
cases. As Panel C of Table 15 shows, eighteen of the twenty-three reor- 
ganization cases exhibited financial distress, a classic marker of a proto- 
typical Chapter 11 case.202 Most of these cases (eleven) suffered financial 
distress as a result of overexpansion.203 Three faced unexpected ex- 
penses in connection with the assets they had bought for their business. 
199. The median firm, as Table 2 showed, had over three dollars of debt for every 
dollar of assets. And most of these assets were encumbered by security interests: The 
median firm had about $148,000 in assets but owed nearly $240,000 to secured creditors 
and tax authorities, implying that little or nothing was available for unsecured creditors in 
most cases. Baird, et al. reach the same conclusion using different data on small business 
bankruptcies. See Baird, et al., Dynamics, supra note 188, at 22-23. 
To the extent that Chapter 11 affected third parties, it was most often the landlord. 
The automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. ? 362(a), prevents (at least temporarily, see ? 365(d) (4)) the 
eviction that would otherwise take place under state law. 
200. A representative example is Automobile Dealer Services, a consulting business 
that specialized in giving seminars for the employees of auto dealerships to train them to 
sell appearance protection products-rust proofing, paint protection, fabric protection, 
and sound treatment-that are designed to make a car look better and last longer. By the 
time of the Chapter 11 petition, the entrepreneur had already formed a number of other 
businesses. See Edmund O. Lawler, That Magic Moment: No Longer a Startup, Crain's 
Chi. Bus., Sept. 5, 1994, at 17 (reporting that owner had already started five other 
businesses). Instead of refocusing his energies on the other businesses, the owner- 
operator turned to Chapter 11 to protect a business whose assets consisted entirely of cash, 
receivables, and office equipment. Within 7 days of filing, the U.S. Trustee moved to 
dismiss, citing the firm's failure to hire legal counsel. The case was dismissed a month 
later; the entrepreneur, apparently, made no effort to hire counsel. 
201. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31). Indeed, the 
evidence is consistent with the conjecture that the judges are as adept in making these 
shutdown decisions as market actors subject to the same constraints. 
202. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
203. A business that overexpands, such as by opening additional stores that are soon 
shut down, experiences financial distress because it must pay the additional obligations 
that were incurred to fund the expansion, but has no new revenue to help meet them. 
The old business remains sound and continues to generate the same revenues as before. 
Because of the failed expansion, however, these are no longer sufficient to pay the 
creditors in full. Hence, there is financial distress (an inability to pay creditors) without 
economic distress (the old business remains sound and continues to use its assets 
effectively). 
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Another three businesses suffered distress because important clients can- 
celled contracts or because members of the business quit and took impor- 
tant clients with them.204 Finally, one entered Chapter 11 with the classic 
example of financial distress-asbestos liability arising from operations 
the business had discontinued nearly forty years before.205 In total, about 
78% of the reorganizations (eighteen of the twenty-three) involved a busi- 
ness that exhibited a classic marker of financial-not economic-distress. 
Chapter 11 might bring benefits in such cases if the businesses were via- 
ble and suffered distress only because of a temporary mismatch between 
revenue and the cost of servicing debt. 
A closer look at the data suggests this is not the case, however. As 
Panel C also shows, similar markers of financial distress (such as over- 
expansion) can be found in 30% of businesses that were shut down in 
bankruptcy or had their cases dismissed. As we saw, these businesses ex- 
hibited strong indicators of lock-in as well. To be sure, the observed inci- 
dence of "financial distress" among these businesses is inflated by the 
number of cases involving "prepetition fraud or other malfeasance," 
something never observed in cases leading to reorganization. By "prepe- 
tition fraud or other malfeasance" we mean cases in which the business or 
its managers defrauded creditors (by, say, diverting funds pledged to a 
lender206), breached fiduciary duties,207 or committed other bad acts.208 
It is unsurprising that such fraud or malfeasance is never present in cases 
resulting in reorganization; the tainted management has lost the trust of 
creditors and a trustee is often appointed. Liability arising from fraud or 
malfeasance, however, is a form of financial distress because the underly- 
ing business may still be profitable. Thus three of the cases exhibiting 
fraud or malfeasance resulted in a going-concern sale. 
204. Again, a one-time shock imposes payment obligations on the business without 
creating additional revenue. Once the shock is gone, the underlying business is again 
sound, but it cannot meet the additional financial burdens that the shock has imposed. 
205. Here again the financial distress arising from the inability to pay decades-old 
asbestos liabilities is independent of how the business is currently run. 
206. See, e.g., Motion of American Equities Group, Inc., for Appointment of a 
Chapter 11 Trustee 2-3, In re DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., No. 98-38160 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 25, 1998) (stating that debtor admitted various breaches of a lending agreement, 
including "convert[ing] an $18,000 check, which was tendered to the Debtor for payment 
of an account receivable that had been purchased from the Debtor by [American Equities 
Group]"). 
207. See, e.g., Examination of Cooper & Soble Insurance Agency, Inc., In re Cooper 
& Soble Ins. Agency, No. 98-20198 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 30, 1998) (finding that debtor, an 
insurance agent, had breached fiduciary duties by diverting client premiums to itself). 
208. See, e.g., Scranton Gillette Commc'ns, Inc. v. Dannhausen, No. 96 C 8353, 1999 
WL 558134 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1999) (upholding jury verdict holding debtor, McCormick 
Communications Ltd., liable for breach of fiduciary duty; upholding jury's finding of 
liability, but ordering new trial on damages, for false advertising); see also First Amended 
Disclosure Statement 4, In re McCormick Commc'ns Ltd., No. 98-40402 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 16, 1998) (explaining that debtor "filed a petition for reorganization as a result of an 
adverse judgment"). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Oct 2015 20:46:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2005] SERIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND CHAPTER 11 2361 
The traditional markers of financial distress, then, tell us little about 
the absence of lock-in. There are at least three reasons for this. First, our 
"markers" of financial distress are based on the self-serving reports of the 
owner-operators.209 They have every incentive to convince judges and 
other creditors that they were merely suffering temporary cash shortages. 
Second, financial distress is often a product of economic distress.210 An 
unprofitable business will often be one that loses significant clients or 
takes on business it cannot serve. 
TABLE 16: MEASURES OF ASSET SPECIFICITY FOR THE MEDIAN BUSINESS, BY 
CHAPTER 11 OUTCOME 
All Cases Shutdowns Restructurings Going 
Measure of (n=104) & Dismissals Reorganizations Without Plan Concern Sales 
Specificity (%) (n=65) (%) (n=23) (%) (n=8) (%) (n=8) (%) 
Land & 28.9 37.0 19.2 21.1 45.3 
Equipment 
Equipment 16.5 16.5 12.9 13.7 38.9 
Nonoffice 5.5 5.3 8.5 9.1 22.3 
Equipment (0.72) (0.92) (0.30) 
Note: Parentheses provide p-values for a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the difference between the median 
in that column and the median in "Shutdowns & Dismissals." 
Finally, and most importantly, even a business suffering pure finan- 
cial (not economic) distress is not necessarily one worth saving in Chap- 
ter 11. To be sure, a distressed business may become profitable again by 
reducing its scale of operations, but it may make more sense for the 
owner-operator to shut down the existing business and start over again. 
Starting from scratch would not make sense if the business used special- 
ized assets, but Table 16 suggests that asset specificity is as insignificant in 
reorganized businesses as it is in businesses that suffered shutdown or 
dismissal. Measuring asset specificity as the ratio of nonoffice equipment 
to total assets, the degree of specificity in reorganizations (8.5%) is only 
slightly greater than it is in businesses that suffered shutdown or dismissal 
(5.3%). The difference is not statistically significant. And, as we ex- 
plained in Part II, these measures of specificity are upper bounds. There 
209. Others have made the same point. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse 
at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
847, 859 ("The bankruptcy petition is a tool for the debtor's advocate who may paint an 
overoptimistic picture of the debtor's financial condition and inflate asset values. Under 
these circumstances, reporting direct costs as a percentage of total assets would tend to 
understate these costs as a fraction of firm value."). 
210. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's Acquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons 
and Implications, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1103, 1121-22 (1994) (explaining that economists 
have been unable "to distinguish whether poor performance by a firm in financial distress 
is caused by the financial distress alone or by the same factors that pushed the firm into 
financial distress in the first place"); see also Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra 
note 59, at 763 (noting that failure of many nineteenth century textile firms "resulted not 
from an inability to service debt but rather from an inability to produce revenue that 
exceeded ongoing operating costs. In these circumstances, financial distress was 
synonymous with economic distress"). 
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is little reason, then, to think that the reorganizations in our sample rep- 
resented efforts to preserve going-concern surplus. 
TABLE 17: PERSONAL IABILITY OF OWNER-MANAGER 
Restructurings 
All Cases Shutdowns Without a Going 
(n=100) & Dismissals Reorganizations Plan (n=7) Concern Sales 
(%) (n=62) (%) (n=23) (%) (%) (n=8) (%) 
Personal 55.8 58.5 65.2 12.5 50.0 
Guarantees (.57) (.01) (.46) 
Personal 61.2 63.3 78.3 42.9 12.5 
Tax (.20) (.08) (.00) 
Liability 
Any 85.0 90.3 91.3 57.1 50.0 
Personal (.89) (.03) (.01) 
Liability 
Note: Parentheses give p-values of a t-test for the difference between the percentage in that column and 
the percentage in "Reorganizations." 
4. Why Do Rational Entrepreneurs Submit to the Lock-In Effect? - Why is 
Chapter 11 attractive to owner-operators who can downsize their busi- 
nesses simply by starting over again? We get a sense of the answer by 
looking closely at the successful reorganization cases. A typical example 
is Luczak Bros.,211 in which an entrepreneur entered Chapter 11, con- 
firmed a plan of reorganization, and continued to run the same business 
after it emerged from Chapter 11.212 Luczak Brothers is a family business 
founded in 1897 that does ornamental plasterwork.213 It encountered 
financial distress because it took on an enormous project-the plaster- 
work for the renovation of the home of the Chicago Symphony Orches- 
tra-and underestimated its costs by $600,000.214 It made mistakes on 
other jobs as well.215 Luczak is a classic case of overexpansion and might 
seem a poster child for Chapter 11. 
Did Chapter 11 preserve any going-concern surplus in this case? No. 
This business, like virtually all of those that successfully reorganized, had 
little in the way of business-specific assets. By far its biggest asset was 
about $470,000 in receivables.216 The other assets included real estate, 
several cars, and $10,000 of inventory.217 It had only $20,000 in equip- 
ment and a quarter of it was office equipment.218 James Luczak would 
run an ornamental plaster business if Luczak Brothers, Inc., disappeared. 
He would continue to employ the same people and exploit the same rela- 
211. In re Luczak Bros., Inc., No. 98-04896 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 7, 1999). 
212. The firm maintains a website. See Luczak Brothers, Inc., at http:// 
www.luczakbros.com (last updated Apr. 5, 2003). 
213. Second Amended Disclosure Statement at 7-8, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896. 
214. Id. at 8. 
215. Id. at 3. 
216. Schedule B at 2, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896. 
217. Schedule A at 1, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896; Schedule B, supra note 216, at 
1-2. 
218. Schedule B, supra note 216, at 2. 
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tionships he always had. There are only modest costs in starting a new 
business and no reason at all to encourage him to use the existing corpo- 
rate entity-Luczak Brothers, Inc.-to conduct his affairs. The existing 
legal regime, however, encourages someone in the position of Luczak to 
do exactly this. 
The overriding issue in Luczak was not keeping specialized assets to- 
gether or saving jobs, but escaping personal tax liability. Like 80% of 
those who confirmed a plan of reorganization in Chapter 11,219 Luczak 
invaded trust funds containing employee withholding taxes to keep the 
business running.220 By doing this, he converted what was a corporate 
obligation into a personal obligation.221 Even though he nominally did 
business in limited liability form, James Luczak did not have the option of 
walking away from this business and starting another on a clean slate. 
Individual liability alone does not bias Luczak towards remaining 
with the existing business. Luczak and the corporation are jointly and 
severally liable to the IRS. Luczak is obliged to pay the tax whether the 
business continues to exist or not.222 Hence, if personal liability for the 
debt was the only issue, he would still choose the path that provided the 
best fit with his human capital. In practice, however, James Luczak can 
keep the IRS at bay by keeping Luczak Brothers, Inc., alive in Chapter 
11.223 In other words, the way in which the IRS handles these sorts of tax 
liabilities pushed James Luczak towards running his plaster business 
under the aegis of Luczak Brothers, Inc., even though there is little or no 
social benefit from organizing his business this way.224 
Chapter 11, then, is attractive because it gives owner-operators access 
to subsidies unavailable in the marketplace. By filing a corporate Chap- 
ter 11 petition, small entrepreneurs can haggle over (and defer payment 
of) tax claims and operate, at least temporarily, with a smaller fraction of 
their revenues going to service other debt. In this fashion, Chapter 11 
encourages owner-operators to remain with an existing business. While 
the owner-operator can return to running the old business and be suc- 
cessful, we do not know whether, absent the distortions brought about by 
219. See supra Table 17. 
220. Second Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 213, at 3; see also Schedule 
E, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896 (listing over $350,000 in withheld taxes owed to IRS and 
Illinois Department of Revenue). 
221. See supra note 23. 
222. I.R.C. ? 6672 (Thomson 2005). 
223. See IRS, supra note 185. 
224. A simpler but similar case is In re Kosick, Inc., No. 98-06215 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 17, 1998). The company performs fiberglass and gel-coat repair to boats and trucks. 
Amended Proposed Disclosure Statement at 6, In re Kosick, No. 98-06215. Most of the work 
is contracted through marinas and consists largely of warranty repairs on new boats. Id. at 
6-7. Kosick got into trouble by deciding to construct two sixteen-foot New Jersey speed 
skiffs, spending in excess of $30,000 on them. Id. No buyers appeared. The vast majority 
(over 97%) of the prepetition debt was owed to the IRS and Illinois state agencies. Id. at 4. 
Chapter 11 was merely a way to deal with government. 
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Chapter 11, he would have been better off starting a different kind of 
business. There is still a lock-in effect. The owner-operator has a power- 
ful incentive to return to his past, regardless of whether he could do bet- 
ter by trying something new. 
To be sure, the costs of lock-in are not substantial in many reorgani- 
zation cases. James Luczak would run an ornamental plaster business 
whether Luczak Brothers, Inc. continued or not. To the extent he 
needed to change his operations-such as by scaling back the number of 
jobs and increasing his supervision of each one-he could do this as well 
using the existing legal shell as with another. The lock-in effect of Chap- 
ter 11 may be small when financial distress has been brought on by over- 
expansion. When the best match of the owner-operator's human capital 
is a return to a smaller, but more sound business using the same assets 
and exploiting the same relationships, Chapter 11 creates relatively few 
distortions. Indeed, as Table 18 shows, among the 11 businesses that suf- 
fered overexpansion and reorganized, only one subsequently failed (and 
it did so four years after exiting bankruptcy). 
Overexpansion, however, characterizes only eleven of the twenty- 
three cases that resulted in reorganization. The remaining twelve cases 
are a mixed bag, some featuring other classic indicators of financial dis- 
tress and others suffering some unspecified type of distress. For these 
businesses, the costs of Chapter 11 are larger. As Table 18 illustrates, four 
failed within one year, five within two, and eight within five. Three of the 
four that failed within a year had confirmed reorganization plans that 
promised repayment of 100% of the claims of unsecured creditors.225 
When financial distress is brought on by factors other than overexpan- 
sion, businesses commonly put forward excessively optimistic reorganiza- 
tion plans and then fail. Chapter 11 encourages these owner-operators to 
gamble (using money supplied by creditors and the government) on the 
resurrection of failing business ventures. 
TABLE 18: CHARACTERISTICS OF REORGANIZATIONS 
Overexpansion cases Asbestos case Other cases 
Frequency 11 1 11 
Failed within 1 year 0 0 4 
Failed within 2 years 0 0 5 
Failed within 5 years 1 0 8 
Thix Enterprises provides an illustration.226 Thomas Hix ran a gaso- 
line and auto service station as Thix Enterprises.227 He had purchased 
the station in 1995, having been service manager there for several years 
225. Among businesses that entered bankruptcy for reasons other than 
overexpansion, half confirmed 100% plans. By comparison, only one of the overexpansion 
cases involved a 100% plan. 
226. In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 19, 1999). 
227. Disclosure Statement at 18, In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184. 
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before the acquisition.228 The business was at best marginally profitable 
when Hix purchased it.229 Thix steadily lost money and fell behind in tax 
payments.230 Costs were reduced by slashing payroll from twenty-four to 
nine employees, and Hix expected to shrink costs further by reducing 
employee health benefits and outsourcing management of the gas 
pumps.231 When the IRS threatened to place a lien on its assets, however, 
Hix put the corporation in Chapter 11.232 A plan of reorganization was 
confirmed,233 but the problems with the business remained. Amoco re- 
fused to renew its lease.234 It appears that Hix lacked the skills to run this 
business and ultimately went to work for an auto service company.235 He 
filed his own personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2002, still encum- 
bered by the IRS obligations of Thix Enterprises.236 Without Chapter 11, 
he might have been able to start a different business or confront the fact 
that he was not cut out to be an entrepreneur earlier. 
Apart from cases of overexpansion, only an odd conjunction of 
events leads the owner-operator to want to place a business in Chapter 11 
and for that business to remain a good match for her human capital.237 
The type of debt that makes Chapter 11 attractive-a tax obligation on 
which the owner-operator is personally liable-usually arises only when 
the business experiences extreme economic distress.238 Owner-operators 
typically invade trust funds (thereby incurring not only personal, but po- 
tentially criminal liability239) as a last resort. Invasion of trust funds fol- 
lows from an inability to meet ongoing operating expenses. Unless things 
change, the business will fail, and, apart from cases of overexpansion, it is 
unlikely that things will change. Few businesses experience economic dis- 
tress sufficiently severe to lead the owner-operators to invade the trust 
funds, yet remain sufficiently sound that running them on a going-for- 
ward basis is possible. 
228. Id. at 20. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 20-21. 
232. Id. at 22. 
233. Order Confirming Plan, In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184. 
234. Motion to Convert Case to Chapter 7 at 1, In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184. 
235. Schedule I-Current Income of Individual Debtors, In re Thomas Vincent Hix 
et al., No. 02-17761 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 18, 2002). 
236. See Schedule E, In re Thomas Vincent Hix, No. 02-17761 (listing over $200,000 
owed to IRS and Illinois Department of Revenue). 
237. Again, only four cases in our entire sample involved businesses suffering from a 
problem other than overexpansion, reorganizing in Chapter 11, and surviving for more 
than five years. See supra Table 18. One faced liability because of the asbestos it once 
used in its furnace linings. See Motion to Approve Insurance and Lien Settlement 
Agreements, for Injunctive Relief Relating Thereto, to Set Hearing Thereon, and to Limit 
Notice Thereof at 1-2, In re M.H. Detrick Co., No. 98-1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 
1998). 
238. The Eating/Drinking Places in our sample provide the best illustration. See 
supra Table 14. 
239. See I.R.C. ? 6672 (Thomson 2005). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Academic and political debates about corporate reorganizations of 
small businesses must change. To date, the focal point has been on the 
particular business housed inside the corporate entity in bankruptcy and 
whether it should be preserved. This makes no sense. In the vast major- 
ity of cases, there is no business worth saving. There is instead an owner- 
entrepreneur who is looking for the best match between her human capi- 
tal and a business venture. Assessments of Chapter 11 should focus on 
how it affects this search and at what cost. Chapter 11 may fare well when 
seen from such a vantage point.240 It may provide "breathing space" that 
facilitates the move to a new venture, as the entrepreneur renegotiates 
personal guarantees with tax collectors and banks. At the same time, 
however, the labor economics approach to Chapter 11 reveals an unap- 
preciated cost. Because Chapter 11 conditions its benefits upon the en- 
trepreneur remaining with the old business, it may unnecessarily delay 
her move to a new business that better matches her human capital. 
The need to focus upon the entrepreneur rather than the business 
was entirely lost in recent efforts to amend the provisions of Chapter 11 
that affect small businesses. The newly-enacted legislation, for example, 
adds new layers of complexity to the Code.241 It increases reporting re- 
quirements,242 limits the exclusivity period to eighteen months,243 and 
imposes tighter deadlines for submitting a plan and achieving confirma- 
tion244-in an effort to improve monitoring by the court and U.S. Trus- 
tee and induce them to "weed out"245 debtors that are unlikely to reor- 
240. It is certainly easier to justify Chapter 11 in the typical case using this approach 
than, for example, by pointing to the benefits Chapter 11 offers small general creditors. 
See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, Contracting, supra note 16, at 1200-01 ("The details of the 
current bankruptcy system . . . can be described generally as constraining the collection 
rights of each creditor individually . . . for the benefit of all concerned."). Given that 
general creditors receive nothing or close to nothing in the typical case, Chapter 11 can 
hardly be defended on the ground that it benefits them. See Baird et al., Dynamics, supra 
note 188, at 22-23 (demonstrating that unsecured creditors receive, on average, 18% of 
what they are owed and that nonpriority creditors receive nothing in 31 % of all cases). 
241. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, ?? 431-437, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 87) 23, 109-18 (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 11 U.S.C.). For helpful analysis of these provisions, see generally Bruce A. 
Markell, Small Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, SL068 ALI-ABA 263 (2005), available at Westlaw, ALI-ABA 
Database. 
242. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ? 434 
(requiring small business debtors to submit period reports on profits, cash flow, and other 
financial information); id. ? 436 (requiring small business debtor to attach to its 
bankruptcy petition "most recent balance sheet, statement of operations, cash-flow 
statement, and Federal income tax return"). 
243. Id. ? 437. 
244. Id. (obligating small business debtors to submit plans of reorganization no later 
than 300 days after order for relief); id. ? 438 (directing courts to confirm plans within 
forty-five days of submission, provided plans comply with other provisions of Code). 
245. See Blum, supra note 146, at 235-46. 
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ganize more quickly. Better monitoring and quicker case resolution 
seem, in the abstract, like sensible goals for any legal system. The focus, 
however, remained upon the business (more specifically, the question of 
whether a plan of reorganization will be confirmed) and not on the en- 
trepreneur. Giving an individual a year and a half to reorganize a busi- 
ness is much too long if her skills are better used elsewhere. 
The latest reform efforts underscore a more serious problem. The 
labor economics approach shows that reforms that focus on the Bank- 
ruptcy Code itself are often too narrow. Chapter 11 petitions are often 
filed because the small entrepreneur invades trust funds earmarked for 
taxes in a last ditch effort to save a business that is destined to fail anyway. 
A sensible labor market intervention should focus on the problem for 
which Chapter 11 is at best an imperfect solution, such as making it 
harder for small entrepreneurs to reach these funds in the first instance. 
For example, the law could require entrepreneurs to pay withholding 
taxes at the same time they issue paychecks. Such a rule may be feasible 
in a world in which electronic fund transfers have become common- 
place.246 The rule would remove the single largest obstacle-personal 
indebtedness for trust fund taxes-that entrepreneurs in Chapter 11 face 
in transitioning to a business that better matches their human capital. 
Such a reform-one that might have dramatic consequences for small 
business bankruptcies-has nothing to do with Chapter 11. 
Other reforms could target the Code itself. Chapter 11 is, as we have 
seen, a labor market intervention that offers particular benefits to entre- 
preneurs who cling to existing business structures. This is yet another 
example of a bankruptcy entitlement that deviates from entitlements 
available under nonbankruptcy law. Just as the Code allows corporations 
to breach collective bargaining duties that are inviolable under federal 
labor law,247 it also offers small-business entrepreneurs temporary liquid- 
ity that is unavailable under laws administered by state and federal agen- 
cies, such as the Small Business Administration. Having substantive rules 
in bankruptcy differ from those in the nonbankruptcy forums has long 
been known to be a bad idea.248 If it is a good idea to offer temporary 
liquidity to entrepreneurs with failing businesses, the policy should apply 
across the board to all businesses, regardless of whether they are in bank- 
ruptcy. It might make sense, then, to expand the services offered by the 
Small Business Administration and contract the availability of Chapter 11, 
perhaps by making it available to businesses of a certain size or with cer- 
tain problems (such as overexpansion). 
246. To eliminate the problem altogether, the law could require small businesses to 
use a third-party provider to issue paychecks and oblige that party to make withholding 
payments at the same time. Under such a regime, the entrepreneur would have no ability 
to pay workers without also turning over withholding taxes. 
247. See 11 U.S.C. ? 1113 (2000). 
248. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy 21-27 (1986). 
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These ideas, however, are only tentative and should not obscure a 
more important point. The Chapter 11 debate must change. The focus 
on rehabilitating the business that has dominated the discussion for de- 
cades is fundamentally misguided. Intelligent reform needs to be 
grounded instead on the effects of Chapter 11 on entrepreneurs' career 
trajectories. Instead of trying to rehabilitate a particular business ven- 
ture, we should focus on the small entrepreneurs themselves and help 
them find the businesses that best match their skills. 
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